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Food Security and the Right to Food: Finding balance in the 2012 
Food Assistance Convention 
 
 
Annamaria La Chimia* 
 
Abstract: On 25 April 2012, after years of negotiations delayed by halts and set-backs, the Food 
Assistance Convention was adopted -the latest in a series of agreements that since 1967 have 
regulated the international provision of food aid. Great expectations have been placed on the 
adoption of the Convention. In particular it was hoped that the Convention would answer the call 
for a new sǇsteŵ of food aid goǀeƌŶaŶĐe, iŶtƌoduĐe ŵoƌe effeĐtiǀe ŵeĐhaŶisŵs to addƌess ǁoƌld͛s 
food insecurity and, ultimately, improve and modernise the rules applicable to food aid.  
‹his papeƌ pƌoǀides the fiƌst ĐƌitiĐal ĐoŵŵeŶtaƌǇ of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s teǆt, assesses the strengths 
and weaknesses of its provisions and considers whether and how the Convention has modified 
the architecture of international food aid regulation. The paper also indicates where amendments 
to the rules might be needed to make the international regulation of food aid more effective. The 
paper concludes that the Convention is, on balance, a positive instrument that could improve 
governance and adequacy of food assistance. The Convention is also important for the 
international human rights discourse on how States can fulfil their obligation to assist countries in 
need in that it offers guidance on how to meet such obligation in the specific context of the right 
to food. States should therefore be urged to sign and ratify it. 
 
Keywords: Food Aid, Food Assistance, Food Assistance Convention, Food Security, Right to 
Adequate Food 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF AN IMPERFECT TOOL TO FIGHT 
HUNGER 
 
For the past 60 years food aid1 has been one of the instruments used to tackle hunger and 
food insecurity around the world.2 However, the provision of food aid and its use are often 
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would like to express my heartfelt thanks to Professor George-Andre Simon for the lively discussions on many 
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1Food aid is defiŶed as ͚Đoŵŵodities pƌoǀided ďǇ iŶteƌŶatioŶal doŶoƌs oŶ ĐoŶĐessioŶal teƌŵs,͛ see WFP, ͚Food 
aid iŶfoƌŵatioŶ sǇsteŵ͛ aǀailaďle at: www.wfp.org/fais/quantity-reporting/glossary accessed 1 August 2013. As 
Barrett and Maxwell argue three elements characterise food aid: the international sourcing (so national food 
schemes, such as food vouchers, are not part of food aid); the concessionality of the financing (with a minimum 
grant element of 80 per cent); and the faĐt that it ĐaŶ ďe ͚iŶ the foƌŵ oƌ foƌ the pƌoǀisioŶ of food,͛ C Baƌƌett aŶd 
D Maxwell, Food Aid After Fifty Years: Recasting its Role (Routledge 2006). The term food assistance has recently 
emerged and for some it better reflects the variety of options available to donors when aiding beneficiary 
countries (see further section 2). In this paper both the term food aid and food assistance will be used, the 
former will be preferred when referring to the period preceding the Convention. No agreed definition of food 
assistance currently exists.  
2 Food iŶseĐuƌitǇ eǆists ǁheŶ people doŶ͛t have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Food insecurity can be 
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questioned: the positive effects of food aid, - its lifesaving nature, its capacity for meeting 
people͛s ƌight to food and to be free from hunger- are often outweighed by its costs.3 Yet with 
more than 1.7 billion people suffering from malnutrition food aid still plays a critical role in 
alleviating the suffering of starving people4 and, as Clapp argues, although ͚it is by no means 
the primary response or the best approach to ensuring food security. Nevertheless, some 150-
200 million people depend on it every year.͛5 No critic would argue for the abolition of food 
aid;6 rather, experts concur on the need to enhance its effectiveness and foster its success.  
In the past decade a consensus has emerged to reconsider the way food aid is used, 
distributed and procured and to redefine and redesign the international architecture of food 
aid donations, including the rules applicable to the granting of food aid. 
Since the mid-sixties the most important international instrument regulating the 
provision of food aid has been the Food Aid Convention (FAC), the only binding international 
agreement between major donors of food aid first concluded in 1967 as part of the 
International Grains Agreement,7 and renegotiated at regular intervals since then (in 1971, 
1980, 1986, 1995 and, lastly, in 1999.8)  
The importance of the FAC has been widely recognised and its provisions have been 
recalled by other international agreements (for example article 10 of the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture refers expressly to some of the commitments endorsed by members of the FAC.9) 
It has been praised for being the sole international agreement to establish a framework of 
ĐoopeƌatioŶ that ͚ďiŶds doŶoƌs to ŵiŶiŵuŵ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts of aid doŶatioŶs͛10 and to set 
boundaries on the use of food aid as a means of export promotion.11 In the wider aid context 
its importance is linked to its being a unique example of aid regulation -being the only 
international agreement to set binding rules on both the quantum (ie. the financial question 
linked to how much assistance should be provided) and the quomodo (ie. in what ways the 
assistance should be provided ) of aid obligations.  
However, over time much criticism has also been raised against the FAC. In particular, 
commentators have criticised the FAC governance system and institutional settings, 
including: the lack of developing couŶtƌies͛ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ iŶ the Đonventions and their 
                                                          
chronic or transitory. Chronic food insecurity is a long term or persistent inability to meet minimum food 
requirements, transitory food insecurity is a short term or temporary food deficit. See www.wfp.org  
3 The literature on the negative consequences of food aid is vast, see for all Barrett and Maxwell (n 1). See also 
E Clay and O Stokke (eds), Food Aid and Human Security (Frank Cass, 2000) 
4See O De shutter, ͚‹he ƌole of deǀelopŵeŶt ĐoopeƌatioŶ aŶd food aid iŶ ƌealisiŶg the ƌight to adeƋuate food: 
ŵoǀiŶg fƌoŵ ĐhaƌitǇ to oďligatioŶ͛, ƌef. A/H‘C/ϭϬ/ϬϬϱ, MaƌĐh ϮϬϬϵ 
5J Clapp, Hunger in the Balance: The New Politics of International Food Aid (Cornell University Press 2012), the 
authoƌ also aĐkŶoǁledges that ͚iŶ situatioŶs of aĐute food shoƌtages… suĐh aid can mean the difference 
ďetǁeeŶ life aŶd death͛ 
6 Barrett and Maxwell (n 1) 
7Adopted along with the Grains Trade Convention.  
8 The 1999 FAC originally expired in 2002 but it was renewed through yearly extensions for almost ten years At 
the 106th session of the Food aid Committee members agreed not to extend the 1999 FAC which was finally 
allowed to expire on 30 June 2012. See http://www.foodaidconvention.org/en/Default.aspx  accessed 5 
December 2013 
9 Article 10.4 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture makes reference to the Food Aid Convention and requires 
aid to be donated fully in grant form (to the extent possible) or on terms no less concessional than those 
provided under the FAC (ie with a minimum concessionality level of 80 per cent). As Clapp argues this reference 
is important because now all WTO members (so not just FAC members) are in effect required to refer to the FAC 
terms. See Clapp (n 5) 
10 Clapp (n 5) 
11Ibid and Barret and Maxell (n 1) 
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exclusion from the work of the FA Committee (the Convention͛s governing body12); the lack 
of transparency in the operation of the FA Committee which weakened its impact on the 
global food security debate;13 the weaknesses of commitments endorsed by FAC members 
and in particular the many loopholes in the conventions system which allow donors to easily 
forsake their obligations; the inadequacy of the FAC monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms and the absence of evaluation procedures to assess the impact that ŵeŵďeƌs͛ 
commitments have on recipient countries.14 More recently, critics have also spoken of the 
͚fadiŶg legitiŵaĐǇ of the FAC͛15 because of its ineffectiveness as a mechanism to guarantee 
appropriate levels of food aid during the 2008 food price crises.  
When the termination date of the 1999 FAC approached, food aid experts saw, in the 
(expected) process for renegotiating the agreement, an opportunity to address this criticism, 
to modernise the rules applicable to food aid and to address the shortcomings of the system 
of food aid donations built within previous agreements. Debates on the renewal of the FAC 
branched into several discrete areas: they focused on key issues of governance (within the 
FAC itself and within the broader food security context16); included discussions on whether a 
new convention was at all needed;17 and covered topical aspects of food aid effectiveness 
with the view to address some of the long-standing problems associated with food aid 
donations, in particular ensuring that food aid is geared towards food security.18 
Negotiations for a new convention first started in 2002 when the 1999 FAC originally 
expired but they were deferred pending the outcome of the negotiations on food aid 
conducted under Art 20 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) as part of the WTO Doha 
Development Round (DDR). The 1999 FAC was in the meanwhile renewed through yearly 
extension. Talks to initiate consultations for a new Convention reopened in 2008, when the 
WTO negotiations stalled and it was clear that WTO members had failed to reach a conclusive 
agreement.19 In 2010 a working committee of the International Grains Council20 (IGC) was 
                                                          
12 The FA Committee is i.e. the forum where rules elaborating further the provisions of the Convention are 
adopted and where information sharing and discussion with other stakeholders is facilitated (see art 7.3 and art 
7.6 of the Convention). All Parties to the Convention are members of the FA Committee. For a critique of the FA 
Coŵŵittee aŶd the laĐk of ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ aŶd NGOs͛ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ see J HoddiŶott and M J Cohen, 
͚‘eŶegotiatiŶg the Food Aid CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛ ;IFP‘I, Apƌil ϮϬϬϳͿ. 
13 see J Hoddinott, M J CoheŶ aŶd C Baƌƌett, ͚‘eŶegotiatiŶg the Food Aid CoŶǀeŶtioŶ: BaĐkgƌouŶd, CoŶteǆt, aŶd 
Issues͛ ;ϮϬϬϴͿ ϭϰ Global Governance 283. 
14 For an extensive analysis of this point and a thorough critique of the 1999 FAC see ibid.  
15 J Clapp and S Clark, ͚Improving the governance of the Food Aid Convention: which way forward?͛ (2010) The 
Centre for International Governance Innovation, Policy Brief  n. 20. 
16 i.e. hoǁ to iŵpƌoǀe goǀeƌŶaŶĐe ǁithiŶ the FAC aŶd hoǁ ͚the FAC ĐaŶ fit iŶto the ďƌoadeƌ gloďal food seĐuƌitǇ 
goǀeƌŶaŶĐe fƌaŵeǁoƌk͛ see Ibid. The broader question of governance included discussions over how the FAC 
should integrate with other international organisations also dealing with food security 
17 E Clay, ͚A Future Food Aid or Food Assistance Convention?͛ (ODI Background Paper on Food Aid No. 6, July 
2010) ͤ http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6040.pdfͥ 
18 See for all J Hoddinott, M J Cohen and C Barrett (n 13) 
19Modalities for a new text of the AoA have been concluded in 2008 [See WTO Committee on Agriculture, 
͚‘eǀised Dƌaft Modalities foƌ AgƌiĐultuƌe—Sensitive Products: DesigŶatioŶ͛ ;ϲ DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϬϴͿ W‹O DoĐ 
TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4] these contained, in Annex L, profuse provisions on food aid. While at the latest Ministerial 
Conference in Bali (7 December 2013) the 2008 Modalities have not been adopted, WTO members agreed that 
theǇ ƌeŵaiŶed ͚iŵpoƌtaŶt ďasis foƌ futuƌe aŶ aŵďitious fiŶal agƌeeŵeŶt iŶ the eǆpoƌt ĐoŵpetitioŶ pillaƌ͛ 
Document WT/MIN(13)/W/12 Page 1.  
20 Since 1967 the IGC has acted as the FAC host agency and secretariat. 
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established and FAC members21 agreed to begin the formal process of renegotiating the 1999 
FAC. At its opening meeting the IGC working group declared that ͚ the pƌoĐess [of ŶegotiatioŶs] 
would start with immediate effect and involve a period of intensive negotiations and further 
consultations over the coming months with the aim of drafting a new convention committed 
to providing appropriate and effective food assistance to vulnerable populations in response 
to Ŷeeds͛ ;eŵphasis addedͿ.22 After two years of negotiations, on 25 April 2012, the Food 
Assistance Convention was adopted23 (hereafter the Convention). The Convention replaces 
the 1999 FAC but it is an independent agreement.24 It entered into force on 1st January 2013, 
following the deposit of the instruments of ratification acceptance or approval by six of its 
signatory Parties.25 
Whilst signatories to the Convention include most countries who were previously 
members26 of the 1999 FAC, ratification however remains slow. Members of the 1999 FAC 
who did not sign the Convention by 31st December 2012 and have not yet done so (for 
example Italy, Germany and the UK) can accede to it at any time.27 Countries who were not 
previously members of the FAC have been able to join the Convention since it entered into 
force.28 For instance, the Russian Federation, an important new donor of assistance, joined 
on 3 April 2014. For the first time since 1967, the Convention has not set a termination date 
but will be in force until Parties agree otherwise.29 
Has the opportunity to ameliorate the rules applicable to food aid been seized by the 
drafters of the Convention? Has the provision of food aid been improved and modernised as 
                                                          
21Members of the 1999 FAC were Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union and its member countries, 
Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. 
22Food Aid Committee, 103rd Session held on 14 December 2010, London, Press Release, 20 December 2010  
ͤhttp:// www.foodaidconvention.org/Pdf/p_r/prfacdec10.pdfͥ accessed 5 December 2013. 
23 Depositary notification C.N.215.2012. Electronic copies of the Convention are posted on the United 
Nations Treaty Collection Website at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/signature/2012/CTC_XIX-48.pdf 
24FAC Chair's Presentation at WFP Executive Board, 6 June 2013, available at 
http://www.foodassistanceconvention.org/pdf/general/FAC_Presentation_WFP_June13.pdf accessed on 5 
December 2013. Albeit an independent agreement the Convention follows within the stream of the Food Aid 
Conventions that since 1967 have regulated the provisions of food aid. Indeed the International Grains Council 
remains the Assistance Convention͛s host ageŶĐǇ aŶd seĐƌetaƌiat (based in London), the objectives of the 1999 
FAC are expressly endorsed by the new agreement (see preamble, paragraph 1 of the Assistance Convention), 
the procedures for accession for members of previous FAC and for new members are different (see art 13 
discussed infra). 
25 According to art 15, the Convention would enter into force on 1 January 2013 if by 30 November 2012 five 
Signatories have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval. Japan was the first country to 
sign the Convention and to deposit the instruments for acceptance (24th July 2012) followed by the US 
(acceptance), Switzerland (ratified), Denmark (approval), Canada (ratified), the European Union (approved), 
Finland (acceptance) Austria (ratified) Luxembourg (ratified), Australia (ratified). Recently, the Russia Federation, 
Slovenia and Sweden have acceded on 3 April 2014, 8 May 2014 and 12 May 2014 respectively. Other 
participants who have signed but have yet to ratify the Convention include Bulgaria, France, Greece, and 
Portugal. 
26The words Members of the 1999 Convention and Parties of the Assistance Convention are used to reflect the 
different terminology employed by the two Conventions. 
27 Art 13(1) of the 2012 FAC.  
28Art 13(2) of the Convention. This now includes important new donors of food assistance such as India, Brazil, 
the Republic of Korea, South Africa. 
29 According to art 17 of the Convention any Party can propose the termination of the Convention at any time 
after its entry into force. As further explained below, the indefinite nature of the Convention might be one of 
the reasons why the Convention depaƌts fƌoŵ pƌeǀious ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs oŶ the ǁaǇ Paƌties͛ agƌee (and now can 
modify) their commitments. 
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a result of its adoption? This article assesses whether and in what ways the Convention has 
addressed the criticism raised against the framework for food aid donations embedded within 
previous FACs and how it has modified the architecture of international food aid regulation.30 
The analysis will also offer the opportunity to reflect on what role the Convention could play 
on the global food security debate and how the Convention could improve food assistance 
governance. Comparisons with previous Food Aid Conventions will be made to help clarify the 
extent of the innovations introduced. Suggestions will be made on where amendments to the 
new rules might be needed to make the international regulation of food aid more effective 
and to attaiŶ the CoŶǀeŶtioŶs͛ oďjeĐtiǀes.   
After this introduction the article is divided into three sections. Section 2 is dedicated 
to the iŶǀestigatioŶ of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶs͛ scope and coverage. The analysis starts in sub-section 
A with an assessment of the Convention͛s objectives and their impact on the expansion of the 
CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s sĐope, including its relevance for the debate on how states can fulfil their human 
right obligation to assist food insecure countries. It then moves in subsection B to consider 
the significance of the name change, asking whether the new name signals the endorsement 
of a new ethos governing the relationship between Parties to the Convention and 
beneficiaries of assistance and to what extent the new ethos is embraced into a new system 
of food aid governance within the Convention.31  To this end the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s iŶstitutioŶal 
arrangements, including the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s Ŷeǁ rules on membership and participation in the 
work of the FA Committee will be investigated. The analysis will then continue with an 
assessment of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s Đoverage (sub-section C), looking in particular at the quantum 
(intended as both quantities and values of Paƌties͛ commitments) and the quomodo of 
Parties͛ obligations (i.e. how aid should be provided, for example in grant form, untied etc.). 
Significant innovations have been introduced by the Convention on the way Parties set (and 
now modify) their commitments and on the way they will deliver food assistance. Reference 
to the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms provided by the Convention will then be 
made to understand how these mechanisms will affect the implementation of the 
CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s pƌoǀisioŶs. Section 3 will consider the controversial issue of the relationship 
with the WTO. It will be here explained what innovations have been introduced by the 
Convention in this area, revealing the potential implications of the new provisions for the 
global food security debate. Section 4 will conclude arguing that, on balance, the Convention 
is a positive instrument that should be ratified by as many countries as possible. It is the only 
legal instrument to offer specific guidance on how States can fulfil their international human 
right obligation to assist countries in need in that it offers guidance on how assistance should 
be provided in the specific context of realizing the right to adequate food. Its implementation 
could improve governance of food assistance, especially thanks to its transparency provisions 
and the enhanced participation of NGOs and beneficiary countries to the work of the FA 
Committee and could enhance the effectiveness of food assistance.  
 
                                                          
30 Such analysis is necessary giǀeŶ the aŵďiguitǇ of soŵe of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s pƌoǀisioŶs aŶd the gap in the 
existing literature. 
31Two different aspects of the question of governance have been identified by scholars namely governance 
within the FAC and governance within the wider food security context, Clapp and Clark provide the clearest 
account of the question of governance which they identify iŶ: ͚hoǁ the FAC ĐaŶ fit iŶto the ďƌoadeƌ gloďal food 
security governance framework and how to improve the performance of the more technical governance 
fuŶĐtioŶs Đaƌƌied out ďǇ the FAC.͛ It is oŶ the latteƌ aspeĐt that this papeƌ fiƌst foĐuses. As Clapp and Clark argue 
͚the goǀeƌŶaŶĐe aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶts of the FAC aƌe esseŶtial foƌ its oǀeƌall peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe.͛ “ee Clapp and Clark, (n 15) 
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1. FROM THE FOOD AID CONVENTION TO THE FOOD ASSISTANCE CONVENTION: A 
NEW ERA FOR THE REGULATION OF FOOD DONATIONS?  
 
A. Setting the frame for discussion: the  CoŶǀeŶtioŶs͛ new objectives and their 
implication for Paƌties͛ oďligatioŶs  
 
Since its first inception the FAC has envisaged a framework of cooperation between donors 
(producers and, for the vast majority, exporters of food) to provide minimum amounts of food 
aid to beneficiary countries in need (the so-called minimum commitment). This original 
framework has embedded all the conventions that followed and is still an essential feature of 
the Convention. However, while the original FAC, mirroring  ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ambivalent use of food 
aid as a tool to face ǁoƌld͛s huŶgeƌ and as a means to promote food exports and dispose of 
surplus stock,32 focused mainly on the quantum of ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts (i.e. how much 
food aid should be donated) with members agreeing to specific quantities of food aid 
donations,33 later conventions (especially those agreed in the nineties) paid greater attention 
to food security and to the quomodo commitments (i.e. the ways in which aid should be 
donated),34 with a view to make food aid more effective. These quomodo commitments 
however remained weak, mainly drafted in terms of best-effort endeavours and relevant only 
for donations made in furtherance of FACs͛ commitments. 
The Convention focuses firmly on food security showing a mature understanding of its 
causes and effects.35 Food security is now inextricably linked with nutrition and with the long-
term rehabilitation and development objectives of the beneficiary countries.36 Significantly 
the Convention, for the first time, recognises “tates͛ ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ in the progressive 
realization of the right to adequate food and to be free from hunger (via reference to the 
2004 FAO Voluntary Guidelines37) therefore unambiguously linking food assistance to the 
realisation of such right. Reference to the right to food is important because it opens the 
possibility of interpreting the provisions within the Convention through a Human Rights lens 
and to question whether the assistance provided is apt to fulfil that right. At the same time, 
as the Convention is the first and only instrument that lays detailed rules on how assistance 
should ďe pƌoǀided it ďeĐoŵes ƌeleǀaŶt foƌ the ďƌoadeƌ huŵaŶ ƌights ĐoŶteǆt of hoǁ states͛ 
fulfill theiƌ huŵaŶ ƌight oďligatioŶ to ͚assist͛ countries in need. Although “tates͛ oďligatioŶ to 
assist is now recognized (albeit not without controversy) as a principle of international human 
rights law for all Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,38 its exact confines remain uncertain 
                                                          
32 As Clapp argues, the adoption of the first FAC was motivated by the desire of its members to regulate and 
impose some limits to the use of food aid as a means to dispose of surplus stocks whilst guaranteeing minimum 
quantities of food aid to countries in need, Clapp (n 5) 
33FAC Chair's Presentation at WFP Executive Board, 6 June 2013, ͤ 
http://www.foodassistanceconvention.org/pdf/general/FAC_Presentation_WFP_June13.pdfͥ 
34For example whether food aid should be donated as grants or loans, whether tied or untied, where it should 
be procured etc. 
35 para 1 of the preamble of the Convention and art. 2. 
36 Art 2(a) and 2(c) 
37 Para 4 of the preamble of the Convention. Curiously the Convention refers to the FAO principles rather than 
to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights where this right was first enshrined (this 
is probably due to the fact that the US, one of its primary signatories, has yet to ratify the ICESCR).  
38 Its biding nature is for many to be inferred from a conjunct reading of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and art 55 and 56 of the UN Charter See O De Schutter, A Eide, A Khalfan, M Orellana, M 
Salomon, I Seiderman, ͚Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the 
area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (2002) 34 Human Rights Quarterly ϭϬϴϰ aŶd foƌ all M “aloŵoŶ, ͚The 
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(i.e. the quantum and quomodo issues of aid have never been set in binding legal 
instruments39) and are mostly still at the discretion of each state. The Convention helps define 
such obligation by committing States Parties to the Convention to donate a certain amount 
of assistance (the quantum issue) in a certain way (the quomodo issue). Such position is 
reinforced by the fact that some of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s pƌiŶĐiples are now of broad application,40 
not confined to the assistance donated under the Convention (i.e. to the minimum 
commitments) but applicable to all assistance provided by Parties, therefore important for 
Paƌties͛ food assistaŶĐe pƌaĐtiĐes iŶ geŶeƌal.41 Hence the Convention helps moving forward 
the Human Rights debate over whether states have an obligation to provide assistance to 
fulfill such right(s) to consider how such obligation is to be fulfilled in the specific context of 
the right to food. 
The CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s appƌoaĐh is Đleaƌ fƌoŵ the outset: food assistaŶĐe is aiŵed at the 
eradication of hunger and should be provided only "when it is the most effective and 
appropriate means of addressing the food or nutrition needs of the most vulnerable 
populations." Contrary to previous conventions, food assistance is no longer regarded as a 
temporary instrument. For instance, the Convention no longer foresees, as its ultimate aim, 
the end for the need of food aid itself as was the case under the 1995 and 1999 Conventions. 
Food assistance is instead regarded a long term development tool. Further, the Convention 
stƌiǀes to eŶsuƌe that food aid is detaĐhed fƌoŵ Paƌties͛ tƌade iŶteƌests. Indeed many are the 
provisions that explicitly exhort Parties not to use food aid to promote their market 
development objectives (article 2(b)(iv)), or in a manner that causes commercial displacement 
(article 2(b)(iv)). Practices that are known to create trade distortion are explicitly forbidden 
(article 5.9 and article 2(b)(iv)) while those that favour local and regional development are 
encouraged (article 2(b)(iii)). 
The Convention also goes a step further than any other conventions when defining 
Paƌties͛ obligations on the way aid should be donated and places greater emphasis than ever 
before on the adequacy of the assistance, including the need to devise food assistance policies 
in consultation with beneficiaries.42 Significantly, the ConveŶtioŶ͛s pƌiŵaƌǇ aƌtiĐle is Ŷo loŶgeƌ 
one that solely specifies which country donates what -indeed such article no longer exists, 
see infra- ďut is aƌtiĐle Ϯ oŶ the ͚pƌiŶĐiples of food assistaŶĐe,͛ that, ǁith its ϮϬ headiŶgs, sets 
                                                          
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: An 
Oǀeƌǀieǁ of Positiǀe ͚OďligatioŶs to Fulfil͛͛, November 16, 2012   ͤhttp://www.ejiltalk.org/author/msalomon/ ͥ. 
The opposite view, held especially by developed states, sustain that development aid is not the consequence of 
an international obligation but the result of a discretionary moral commitment and as Cataldi says ͚theƌefoƌe 
that sense of obligation on the part of states (opinion juris) which along with the diuturnitas is considered the 
ĐoŶstitueŶt eleŵeŶt of aŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal Đustoŵ, does Ŷot seeŵ to eǆist͛  see G Cataldi aŶd G. “eƌƌa, ͚tied 
deǀelopŵeŶt aid: a studǇ oŶ soŵe ŵajoƌ legal issues͛ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ 10 Italian Yearbook of International Law 219 at p. 
222 
39 Cataldi and Serra Ibid 
40 Art 2 oŶ the ͚pƌiŶĐiple of food assistaŶĐe͛ Đalls oŶ Paƌties to ͚always adheƌe to these pƌiŶĐiples͛ -emphasis 
added.The broad application of this provision is also to be inferred by the fact that when the Convention intends 
to limit an obligation to the commitment under the Convention it specifically says so, see for example various 
paragraphs in art 5 where wording such as ͚uŶdeƌ the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛ ͚iŶ ƌespeĐt of the ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts͛ aƌe eǆpliĐitlǇ 
used to indicate that a specific obligations is limited to the assistance donated to fulfil the minimum 
commitments.   
41This means that the validity of the principles there endorsed can no longer be questioned, at least by Parties. 
For example by agreeing to the Convention the US has recognized that local and regional purchases are effective 
means of providing assistance. ‹his is ǀeƌǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶ the U“ ĐoŶteǆt ǁheƌe the CoŶgƌess͛ opposition to reform 
US food aid has focused on questioning the benefits of triangular and regional purchases (see infra).   
42 See art 2. 
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the rules on the quomodo of food assistance (i.e. the ways in which assistance should be 
donated) and is the heart of the new Agreement. These latter  obligations are central to the 
aĐhieǀeŵeŶt of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s Ŷeǁ oďjeĐtiǀes to pƌoǀide assistaŶĐe ǁhiĐh is adeƋuate to 
meet benefiĐiaƌies͛ Ŷeeds aŶd that is safe, effiĐieŶt, effective nutritious and based on needs 
(article 1). Such emphasis is also paƌt of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s Ŷeǁ oďjeĐtiǀe to ͚seek to iŵpƌoǀe 
the effeĐtiǀeŶess, effiĐieŶĐǇ aŶd ƋualitǇ of food assistaŶĐe͛ ;pƌeaŵďle paragraph 2) indeed 
only by improving the rules on the way the assistance is donated can it be made more 
effective; it reflects the initial mandate of the IGC working group renegotiating the FAC43 and 
is in line with the international context of the many aid effectiveness initiatives that since 
2002 have followed one another and within which the Convention is to be placed.44 In this 
respect, by being the first and only agreement to set the rules which implement the 
internationally agreed aid effectiveness targets and that incorporates well established 
principles of food aid effectiveness, the Convention not only places itself within the stream of 
those initiatives but takes the lead when it comes to setting standards for enhancing the 
effectiveness of food assistance.45  
It is submitted that the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s Ŷeǁ oďjeĐtiǀes breathe new life into the 
commitments endorsed by Parties and assign a new significance to the role the Convention 
could play in the eradication of hunger debate. It is in light of these new objectives that the 
Convention will need to be interpreted and its implementation by Parties assessed.  
 
B. New name, new ethos and new governance?  
 
The first change brought about by the new Convention lies in its title. After nearly 45 years 
the name of the Convention has been changed from the Food Aid Convention to the Food 
Assistance Convention (emphasis added). PƌoďleŵatiĐallǇ hoǁeǀeƌ, the teƌŵ ͚assistaŶĐe͛ has 
not been defined and it has not been clarified whether and how it differs from the teƌŵ ͚aid͛ 
despite the latter being used in one instance in a distinctive manner from assistance, implying 
that the two terms are different.46  
As noted by Clark and Clapp the new name ͚ƌefleĐts that the Ŷeǁ tƌeatǇ alloǁs foƌ ŵoƌe 
kinds of assistance (beyond just food and seeds) to be counted by donors as part of their 
commitments,͛47 mirroring also the fact that for more than a decade food aid ͚has not been 
limited to the provision of food but has included the provision of cash (or a combination of 
                                                          
43The IGC mandate was to draft ͚a new Convention committed to providing appropriate and effective food 
assistaŶĐe͛ see FA Committee 103 session (n22) 
44 The very preamble to the Convention places food aid within the global discourse on enhancing aid 
effectiveness. The 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness is expressly recalled at para 5, together with 
reference to the Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security and the 2009 Declaration of the World 
Summit on Food Security.  
45 For example the principles in art 2 include providing assistance in such a way as to protect livelihood and local 
production, avoid dependency, involve beneficiaries in the assessment of their needs, purchase food locally or 
regionally whenever possible, provide untied cash-based food assistance etc. Such principles have been 
recognized by the international community (see for all the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness) and are now 
for the first time incorporated into a legally binding agreement.  
46 Art 2(a)(vi) specifies that food aid (so not food assistance) is to be provided [always] in fully grant form 
whenever possible. A similar obligation is provided for food assistance in Art 5.7, but in this instance the 
obligation is limited to commitments under the Convention. Given that the broader obligation applies to aid 
oŶlǇ it is ƌeasoŶaďle to assuŵe that ͚aid͛ is diffeƌeŶt fƌoŵ ͚assistaŶĐe͛. 
47S Clark and J Clapp, ͚‹he ϮϬϭϮ Food AssistaŶĐe CoŶǀeŶtioŶ: Is a Pƌoŵise “till a Pƌoŵise?͛ 
ͤhttp://triplecrisis.com/the-2012-food-assistance-convention-is-a-promise-still-a-promise/ͥ  
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both).͛48 Arguably, however, the new name does not just reflect the broader range of options 
available to donors to fulfil their commitments49 but it also underlines a new ethos governing 
the relationship between Parties to the Convention -donors of assistance- and beneficiaries 
characterised by mutual collaboration and participation in the design and implementation of 
food security and food assistance policies.  
The term ͚AssistaŶĐe,͛ defiŶed in the online Oxford Dictionary as ͚the action of helping 
someone by sharing ǁoƌk͛,50 helps to emphasise the shift from the donor-centred approach 
of previous FACs51 to a new partnership between Parties to the Convention and beneficiaries 
of assistance. The new ethos also reflects the call for a strong donor-beneficiary relationship 
made by the many aid effectiveness initiatives which have followed one another in the past 
decade,52 it is in the context of those initiatives that the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s appƌoaĐh is to ďe plaĐed 
(it is no coincidence that many of those initiatives are recalled in the preamble to the 
Convention). An array of provisions within the Convention helps operationalize this change: 
from the rules related to the ways in which the assistance should be provided  to those 
specifically concerned with products and standards. For instance, from the very outset and 
with a view to enhancing aid effectiveness, Parties are encouraged to strengthen cooperation 
and coordination with beneficiaries (preamble, paragraph 2); beneficiaries are urged to 
develop aŶd iŵpleŵeŶt ͚ĐouŶtƌǇ-owned strategies that address the root causes of food 
inseĐuƌitǇ͛(preamble paragraph 5) and are recognised as having ͚the primary role and 
responsibility for the organisation, coordination and implementation of food assistance 
operation͛53 (emphasis added). Again in Art 2 Parties are asked to involve beneficiaries ͚iŶ the 
assessment of their needs and in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
food assistance.͛54 
 Beneficiaries͛ role is further emphasised by the new rules on food standards and on 
adequate and eligible products. Article 2(c)(iii) by requiring doŶoƌs to ͚ pƌoǀide food assistance 
that meets applicable safety and quality standards,͛ aŶd ďǇ eliŵiŶatiŶg pƌeǀious ƌefeƌeŶĐe to 
international standards, opens up the possibility that ƌeĐipieŶts͛ ŶatioŶal food staŶdaƌds are 
taken into account when deciding what to donate as assistance.55 This, as further explained 
below, unlocks a whole new range of options iŶ ƌelatioŶ to the legalitǇ, ƋualitǇ aŶd ͚ adeƋuaĐǇ͛ 
of the assistance.  
                                                          
48 Ibid. DoŶoƌs͛ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts Ŷoǁ iŶĐlude the use of Đash aŶd vouchers and other items (see infra). 
49‹he faĐt that Đash aŶd ǀouĐheƌs Đould also ďe Đoǀeƌed ďǇ the teƌŵ ͚aid͛ has Ŷeǀeƌ ďeeŶ douďted, ďesides aƌt 
4.3 and Rule 3 of the Rules of procedures and implementation which define what can be included as 
commitment could have alone sufficed to ensure broader range of options available to donors to fulfil their 
commitments.  
50 ͤhttp://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/assistanceͥ 
51 See in contrast art VIII para (g) of the 1999 FAC which only exhorts members to consult with each other, 
ĐooƌdiŶatioŶ aŶd ĐollaďoƌatioŶ ǁas theƌe liŵited to ͚ďetǁeeŶ ŵeŵďeƌs͛.  
52The international community has responded to the criticism against aid via an array of initiatives aimed at 
enhancing aid success: four high level fora on aid effectiveness have followed one another since 2000, and 
various declarations and plan of actions have been endorsed by donor and recipient countries to make aid more 
effective. For example the Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness recalled in the preamble to the Assistance 
Convention 
53 Art 2 para (b)(viii) 
54 Art 2 para (c)(ii) 
55 The 1999 FAC art 2(c)(iii) referred to ͚iŶteƌŶatioŶal staŶdaƌds,͛ the Convention removes reference to 
international standards mentioning simply ͚appliĐaďle safetǇ aŶd ƋualitǇ staŶdaƌds͛. This indicates that now 
ƌeĐipieŶts͛ ŶatioŶal staŶdaƌds ĐaŶ also ďe takeŶ iŶto aĐĐouŶt. See also art 4(3).  
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The rules on the modalities of the assistance are also important in this context. For 
instance, donors are asked to reduce the provision of in-kind tied food aid that, amongst other 
problems, has also been associated with low levels of adherence to ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ food 
preferences.56  
However, how far does the Convention go in redefining ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ role within the 
Convention? Does, for example, the renewed partnership transmute into a renewed system 
of food aid governance? Can beneficiaries become Parties to the Convention? Do they have 
a concrete chance to influence the adoption of multilateral food security policies? The 
following pages address these issues by looking at the Convention institutional settings and 
argue that although some of the new provisions could help fill the governance gap within the 
Convention problems still remain which risk compromising the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s credibility and 
legitimacy to influence the global food security discourse.  
 
1. Institutional settings: 
 
a) Accession to the Convention and Participation in the work of the Food Assistance 
Committee 
 
The possibility to become a Party to the Convention is open to countries who were 
previously members of the FAC, to all other States and, for the first time, to Separate Customs 
territories.57 It remains unclear whether this possibility is now also open to beneficiary 
countries58. An interpretation that suppoƌts ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ paƌtiĐipatioŶ seems favoured both 
by the fact that, when setting the rules for accession, the Convention does not distinguish 
between states who provide assistance and states that receive it (the Convention simply 
ƌefeƌs to ͚“tates͛Ϳ, and by the fact that explicit reference to ĐouŶtƌies͛ ĐapaĐitǇ to ŵake 
minimum commitments (present instead in the 1999 FAC59) has been removed from the 
Convention itself.60  
                                                          
56 See below the extensive discussion on tied food aid.  
57Art. 12 and 13. According to art 13(2). Custom territories can accede to the Convention only after being 
deemed eligible by a decision of the FA Committee. When considering an application for accession made by 
Custom Territories the Committee will take into account the minimum annual commitment that the applicant is 
prepared to make. When reading both the French and English versions of art 12 and 13 it remains unclear 
ǁhetheƌ the FA Coŵŵittee͛s decision –and the procedures for reaching such decision- is mandatory when both 
Custom Territories and other states who were not previously members of FAC make an application or just for 
the former. Rule 13, which provides details on how the Committee can reach its decision, is silent on this point. 
Besides Rule 13 contains a grave typological error in that it wrongly refers to art 13(1) instead of 13(2) [article 
13(1) refers back to art 12, i.e. FAC members who can accede to the Convention at any time, Rules 13 should 
instead have referred to art 13(2) and should have clarified if the pƌoĐeduƌes oŶ the FA Coŵŵittee͛s deĐisioŶ oŶ 
Parties accession applied to both states and custom territories]. 
58 Some have argued that the Convention is not open to beneficiary states, see IFRC, ͚IFRC calls on states to 
ratify the Food Assistance Convention͛ ;IF‘C, 17 February 2014)  
ͤhttp://ifrc.org/PageFiles/119268/IFRC%20call%20for%20ratification%20of%20the%20Food%20Assistance%20
Convention.pdf ͥ iŶ ŵǇ ǀieǁ only vulnerable populations are precluded from accessing the Convention 
because, even though they can now be beneficiaries of assistance, they aƌe Ŷot ͚States͛ or ͚other custom 
territories͛. 
59The 1999 FAC reference to minimum commitments was set in Art III (i) at 20000 tonnes (with the possibility 
to be reduced to 10000 tonnes over a period of 3 years under certain circumstances). This led to the 
assumption that countries unable to provide food aid could not accede to the FAC. 
60Indirect reference to minimum commitments is present in Rule 13 of the Rules of Procedures and 
Implementations establishing that ͚iŶ ĐoŶsideƌiŶg aŶ appliĐatioŶ foƌ aĐĐessioŶ to the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ uŶdeƌ article 
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SiŶĐe ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ paƌtiĐipatioŶ to the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ is a ƌadiĐal depaƌtuƌe fƌoŵ the past, 
clarification on this point would be beneficial. No beneficiary country is currently a Party to 
the Convention. The FA Committee will have a fundamental role to play in encouraging such 
participation. The first meetings of the Committee under the new Convention suggest that 
positive steps in this direction have been taken as two beneficiary countries, namely Cuba 
and Kenya, have for the first time participated as observers to the meetings of the FA 
Committee. Arguably only by institutionalising beneficiaries͛ presence within the Convention 
will they be able to influence multilateral food aid practices. Any other position would 
relegate partnership between Parties and beneficiaries to a bilateral affair with donors 
Đapaďle of iŶflueŶĐiŶg oŶlǇ iŶdiǀidual aid pƌojeĐts at doŶoƌs͛ disĐƌetioŶ. 
NGOs and International organisations continue to be precluded from becoming 
Parties to the Convention ;ďeĐause theǇ aƌe Ŷeitheƌ ͚States͛ nor ͚custom territories͛Ϳ. Yet 
these non-state actors play a prominent role in many developing and Least Developed 
countries, and generally on the global food security scene. For example in 2012 the WFP 
delivered over 50 per cent of all food aid donations to developing and LD countries. Excluding 
such major players of food assistance (and primary holders of food assistance knowledge) 
could weaken the Convention͛s impact on the global food security debate and its success in 
devising suitable food assistance strategies. In the past, this governance gap has been filled 
by inviting international organisations as observers to the meetings of the FA Committee. 
Participation however was limited to a few international organisations and to donors of aid 
;oďseƌǀeƌs iŶĐluded ͚Ŷeǁ͛ doŶoƌs suĐh as Bƌazil aŶd “outh AfƌiĐa.Ϳ  
The possibility of inviting non-parties to the FA Coŵŵittee͛s meetings has now been 
formalised by article 9(4) which foresees the possibility that ͚the committee may invite 
observers and relevant stakeholders who wish to discuss particular food assistance related 
ŵatteƌs…͛ ;Eŵphasis addedͿ. This provision has been described as sigŶalliŶg ͚a poteŶtial shift 
toward greater transparency and openness in the operation of the treaty.͛61  
However, the process for inviting non-parties remains unclear as no information is 
provided on what type of criteria the Committee should follow to select or accept requests of 
participation by interested stakeholders. The Committee maintains full discretion on whether 
and when to invite non-parties.62 A broad range of stakeholders have been invited to the first 
three meetings of the FA Committee since the adoption of the Convention63 including NGOs 
                                                          
13 (1) of the Convention, the Committee is to take into account all relevant factors, in particular the minimum 
annual commitment that the appliĐaŶt is pƌepaƌed to ŵake iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith aƌtiĐle ϱ ;ϭͿ of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛ 
(emphasis added). It could be argued that because the minimum annual commitment is the only factor 
mentioned and because no explanation is given of what other ͚ƌeleǀaŶt faĐtoƌs͛ could be taken into account, the 
͚ŵiŶiŵuŵ aŶŶual ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt͛ eleŵeŶt aĐƋuiƌes speĐial iŵpoƌtaŶĐe, to the eǆteŶt that it could be questioned 
whether the Committee could grant accession to States that are unable to make (appropriate) minimum 
commitment. However another aspect of this provision is unclear, namely whether it at all applies to States or 
to custom territories only. The language (in both the French and English official versions of the Convention) 
suggests that it applies to the latter only. Furthermore, such indirect reference to minimum commitment cannot 
be compared to previous reference to minimum commitments under the 1999 FAC as in that instance specific 
quantities of commitments were set and hence would be insufficient to exclude beneficiaries States. 
61 Clapp and Clark (n 47) 
This is clear from the adoption of the wording ͚the Đoŵŵittee may iŶǀite͛. It seeŵs that soŵe sessioŶs of the 
meetings, i.e. the so-Đalled ͚Đlosed ŵeetiŶgs͛ ĐoŶtiŶue to ďe ƌeseƌǀed to Paƌties oŶlǇ.  
63International organisations and other donors were also invited. The second meeting on 12 November 2013 
saw participation as observers by representatives from Brazil, Slovenia, Spain, the World Food Programme, and 
the Canadian Foodgrains Bank (the latter a NGO). This meeting was preceded on 11 November by a seminar on 
nutritional interventions that involved a wide audience, for example a representative from Save the Children 
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and beneficiaries (together with international organisations and other donors). It is hoped 
that this trend towards broader participation will continue in future. Participation by 
beneficiaries and NGOs could have a positive impact on the discussions that will be held at 
the meetings –allowing for example consideration of interests that are not exclusively driven 
by donors͛ iŶteƌests and accounting for other forms of governance closer to people and 
society.64 However, the powers that invited stakeholders retain remains limited.65 For 
example, only Parties to the Convention have equal right to vote and veto decisions being 
taken by the Committee66 and invited observers cannot oppose the adoption of a decision by 
the Committee. Similarly, observers cannot raise claims for failure to implement the 
CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s commitments67 and do not have access to Paƌties͛ aŶŶual ƌepoƌts.68 Arguably, 
only when all the actors that are involved in deploying assistance have an equal role in the 
workings of the FA Committee, being fully integrated in the decision-making and information-
shaƌiŶg pƌoĐesses ǁhiĐh take plaĐe at the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s iŶstitutioŶal leǀel, can a new system 
of food aid governance be established. One that is fully in line with the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s shift 
fƌoŵ food aid as suƌplus disposal ;aŶd heŶĐe as doŶoƌs͛ oŶlǇ ďusiŶessͿ to food assistaŶĐe as a 
long term tool to face food Security.  
 
C. Coverage: the quantum and quomodo of Parties͛ coŵŵitŵeŶts  
 
1. Parties͛ quantum obligations: the ͚Minimum annual ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt͛ 
 
a) A fleǆiďle appƌoaĐh to Paƌties͛ annual commitment 
 
                                                          
was also invited, yet Save the Children was not present at the formal meeting the following day. The seminar 
ǁas ͚aiŵed at eǆĐhaŶgiŶg iŶfoƌŵatioŶ oŶ aĐtiǀities aŶd ďest pƌaĐtiĐe, as ǁell as iŵpƌoǀiŶg the common 
understanding on global needs and gaps. See FA Committee, Press release, 12 November 2013, 
ͤhttp://foodassistanceconvention.org/en/press/press.aspxͥ. A report of the session is available at 
ͤhttp://foodassistanceconvention.org/downloads/sumrec/fac1_sr.pdfͥ The third meeting was attended by all 
signatories to the Convention and former members of the Food Aid Committee, the government of Brazil was 
also present as an observer together with two beneficiaries, namely Cuba and Kenya, and a representative from 
TAFAD (representing a group of NGOs).  
64 For example remarkable is the role played by TAFAD (Trans-Atlantic Food Assistance Dialogue, an association 
of NGOs) during the process of renegotiating the Convention in terms of gearing towards food security the 
discussions held during the negotiations for the new Convention and lobbing for greater transparency and better 
use of aid resources. TAFAD is also to be praised for bringing discussions regarding the FAC to the public 
attention. It is therefore not surprising that representatives from TAFAD have been invited to the meetings of 
the FA Committee since the adoption of the new Convention.  
65 ‘ule ϭϮ;dͿ of the ‘ules of pƌoĐeduƌes aŶd iŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ states that ͚pƌoĐeediŶgs of foƌŵal sessioŶs aŶd 
iŶfoƌŵal ŵeetiŶgs aƌe to ƌeŵaiŶ ĐoŶfideŶtial.͛ ‹his pƌoǀisioŶ is laid doǁŶ iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of deteƌŵiŶiŶg the 
rules for participation of interested stakeholders in the works of the committee so it is directly relevant to 
proceedings of meetings where those stakeholders are also present. This will also limit the possibility to 
monitor the role played in the meetings by non-Parties (and more generally knowing whether the decisions of 
the Committee are inclusive of their interests)  
66 According to art 7(4), the FA Committee adopts decisions by consensus, i.e. any Party to the Convention can 
oppose a decision by the Committee. 
67 See art 11 only Parties have the ƌight to puƌsue ďƌeaĐhes of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s oďligatioŶs aŶd to uphold its 
implementation 
68See further section 4. 
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In order to meet the objectives of the Convention each Party agrees to make annual 
commitments of food assistaŶĐe, kŶoǁŶ as ͚ŵiŶiŵuŵ aŶŶual ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt͛ ;article 5(1)). 
Donors can of course donate more than their minimum commitment if they want to.  
Individual (for each member) and collective (together for all members) levels of 
commitments used to be inserted in the FACs͛ text. Members were bound to those specific 
commitments (without the possibility to modify them) for the whole life of the Convention 
and could be modified only once a new convention was adopted. For example, with the 1986 
and 1995 FACs, members agreed to secure collectively at least 10 million tons of food 
annually.69 This was reduced by the 1999 FAC to approximately 4.9 million metric tons (mmt) 
of food.70 Individual commitments differed significantly for each member. For instance, in 
1999 the US committed to donate 2,500,000 tonnes of wheat equivalent while Argentina 
committed 35,000, the EU and all its Member States 1,320,000 tons and Euro 130 million (for 
a total indicative value of Euro 422 million71)  
The Assistance Convention brings in significant changes in this area. Parties͛ 
commitments are no longer specified in the text of the Convention and no total collective 
level of assistance has been agreed. Each Party instead is to notify the Secretariat of its annual 
commitment by 15 of December each year.72 The level of commitment can be different each 
year (hence, Paƌties͛ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts could be decreased or increased from year to year.) The 
(updated) level of minimum annual commitment for each Party will be communicated to all 
the Parties to the Convention by the first of January of each year by the Secretariat. 
A flexible approach to commitment was probably necessary and instrumental given 
(and to ensure) the a libitum nature of the Convention and to avoid the (painful) process of 
renegotiating the Convention every few years.73 However, in an era where the call for 
ĐeƌtaiŶtǇ aŶd pƌediĐtaďilitǇ of doŶoƌs͛ doŶatioŶs is stƌoŶg and food price fluctuations can 
steer hunger and starvation across the globe, the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s fleǆiďle appƌoaĐh oŶ Paƌties͛ 
commitments is, at the very least, surprising if not undesirable. This is especially so since the 
possibility to change the level of commitments each year risks institutionalising the 
countercyclical nature of food aid, i.e. if harvests are low in a given year (for example in July) 
Parties can (now legitimately) reduce their commitments (in December) for the following 
year.74 A cause of further criticism is also the fact that no food security assessment is linked 
to the level of commitments made (both for the initial commitment and for subsequent ones) 
                                                          
69 Target recommended by the 1974 World Food Conference. 
70 Art III of the 1999 FAC laid down the specific commitment for each member. The USA pledged to provide 2.5 
mmt equal to 51% of the total commitment, see C Hanrahan and C Canada International Food Aid: U.S. and 
Other Donor (, Congressional Research Service, 2011).The 10000 tons commitment remained as a general goal 
in the preamble to the 1999 FAC. “ee J HoddiŶott, M CoheŶ aŶd C Baƌƌett, ͚‘eŶegotiatiŶg the Food Aid 
CoŶǀeŶtioŶ: BaĐkgƌouŶd, CoŶteǆt, aŶd Issues͛ ;ϮϬϬϴͿ ϭϰ Global Governance 283. 
71 For the first time in 1999 the EU ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt ǁas eǆpƌessed thƌough a ͞ a ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of value aŶd ƋuaŶtities͟ 
(art III (E) of the 1999 FAC.) 
72 ;Aƌt ϱ.;ϰͿ aŶd ϱ.;ϱͿͿ iŶitial aŶŶual ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt aƌe to ďe Ŷotified ǁithiŶ thƌee ŵoŶths of a Paƌties͛  aĐĐessioŶ 
to the Convention 
73 Renegotiating the Convention had been a long a painful process and one which Parties wanted to avoid having 
to repeat on a regular basis. At the same time the absence of a termination date meant that Parties required 
the option to be able to to modify their financial commitments over time.   
74The countercyclical nature of food aid donations have long been exposed by critics (i.e. food aid is least 
available when prices are high and food is needed the most, abundant when prices are low. See J Hoddinott et 
all (n 14). The Convention, by allowing parties to modify their commitments each year, institutionalises and 
legalise the countercyclical nature of food aid and although this defeats the spirit of the Convention, it is still 
permissible within the rules. 
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raising the suspicious that the oŶlǇ ƌatioŶal foƌ the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s fleǆiďle appƌoaĐh to 
commitments is to allow Parties to take into account their own financial situation rather than 
the ǁoƌld͛s food iŶseĐuƌitǇ status.  
Another cause of concern is the absence of specific mechanisms preventing Parties 
from unreasonably reducing their commitments and guaranteeing that adequate levels of 
assistance continue to be provided. For example, Parties do not have to justify the changes 
made to commitments nor are they required to monitor the food security impact of those 
changes.75  
This author believes that Parties should have been invited to express their 
commitments on a multiannual basis (for example on a five year cycle76), as this would ensure 
predictability of resources while guaranteeing flexibility and avoiding speculation on the basis 
of price fluctuations. Parties should also be required to disclose the reasons for introducing 
any change to the level of commitments and, if changes are made, should undertake food 
security analysis of their impact. This would ensure accountability and allow the adoption of 
measures limiting negative food security effects (for example other Parties could be lobbied 
to fill the commitments gap left by the Party who has made the reduction).  
In the absence of any other mechanism, peer and public pressure alone are left to 
deter Parties from reducing their commitments. However their success is linked to the quality 
of the information available and to the widespread availability of that information. It is hoped 
that the FA Committee will facilitate the sharing of information amongst Parties and to the 
public, ensuring Parties release intelligible data on the level of aid donated each year and 
clearly indicating if commitments have been reduced. It is hoped that such information will 
also be easily available to the public. 
A final point to consider is whether the absence of Paƌties͛ specific commitments in 
the Convention͛s text affects the nature of the obligations endorsed. The FAC(s) were praised 
for being the only international treaties to impose a legal obligation on donors to provide 
specific quantities of food aid donations,77 does the fact that the Convention no longer 
specifies the amount of food assistance that Parties will donate weaken the strength of the 
obligations endorsed? A negative answer to this question seems appropriate given that, even 
though Paƌties͛ commitments are not expressed in the Convention͛s text, each Party is 
required to communicate the Secretariat, ahead of the year for which the commitment is due, 
the specific commitment endorsed, thus entering a legal obligation to provide the stated 
assistance for each year.   
 
b) Minimum value, minimum quantity or both 
 
WheŶ the FAC ǁas fiƌst adopted Meŵďeƌs͛ ŵiŶiŵuŵ aŶŶual ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts ǁeƌe expressed 
exclusively in tonnages of wheat equivalent.78 The 1999 FAC introduced for the first time the 
possibility to express commitments in value also. In this latter instance however members 
were also required to speĐifǇ ͚a guaƌaŶteed aŶŶual toŶŶage,79͛ to avoid that FAC 
                                                          
75 Some NGOs (TAFAD and the Food grains Bank) have stressed the weakness of this aspect of the Convention 
and are lobbing for greater predictability and transparency. See http://www.foodgrainsbank.ca/news  
76 Indeed, predicting price fluctuations on a five-year cycle is more difficult than from year to year.  
77Clapp (n 5). 
78 FaiƌlǇ sooŶ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ doŶatioŶs iŶĐluded Đash aŶd ǀouĐheƌs ďut ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts ĐoŶtiŶued to ďe 
expressed in wheat equivalents  
79 see article III (b) of the 1999 FAC 
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commitments were conditioned by food price fluctuation, i.e. no matter how much the price 
of food increased, members were still obliged to guarantee their minimum annual food 
tonnage.   
The Assistance Convention has introduced a major novelty: parties can now express 
their commitments in terms of minimum value, in tons of wheat equivalent or both 80, without 
having to specify a guaranteed annual tonnage (article 5(2)).81 Food aid experts have voiced 
major concerns on the possible negative impact that this provision could have on food 
insecurity.82 Indeed, abolishing the requirement to guarantee minimum food tonnages might 
lead to insufficient food quantities when food prices are high as the purchasing power of cash 
donations diminishes and less quantities of food can be purchased. Yet Parties still fulfil their 
CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts. This is an offbeat measure that goes against the primary aim of 
the Convention, namely food security. Rigorous monitoring will be necessary on the impact 
that this provision will have in terms of food security implications for beneficiary countries to 
eŶsuƌe that the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to aĐt as a guaƌaŶtee foƌ food seĐuƌitǇ is Ŷot 
compromised. Worryingly the Convention does not foresee any mechanism to this effect.  
It seems that one of the rationales behind the adoption of this provision was the desire 
of most of the government representatives negotiating the Convention to avoid bureaucratic 
impasses like those created during the 2008 ͞Food PƌiĐes Cƌisis͟ when aid officials had to 
repeatedly apply for new budget allocations to cover the costs of increased food prices in 
order to fulfil their FAC obligations (at the time expressed in quantities of wheat equivalent). 
This was, for example, a major problem for the European Commission that under the 1999 
FAC had committed to provide 500,000 tons per year, yet because of the increase in food 
prices the original budget allocated for food aid purchases and transferred from DG 
Development to ECHO was insufficient to cover the actual costs of the original FAC tons 
commitments (ECHO food aid service had to repeatedly apply for additional funds to meet 
what was for them the same obligation.) This situation had caused frustration at both the 
administrative and political levels and has contributed to the adoption of the unfortunate 
decision to opt for value commitments only without the obligation to express a quantity 
equivalent. Hence the incapacity to plan, to monitor food prices, the rigid institutional 
bureaucracies to which donors are bound and  the incapacity of the international system to 
prevent food price speculations have prevailed compromising the effectiveness of the 
Convention to act as a guarantee for food security.  
 
c) Activities and products 
 
Parties can fulfil their commitments via donating eligible products, cash and vouchers, and 
via nutritional interventions (classified as eligible activities by article 4.4 and Rule 1 of the 
rules of procedure and implementation). The list of activities is broad yet it does not 
                                                          
80 Parties can choose the currency through which to express their value commitments. Quantity commitments 
can be expressed in tons of wheat equivalent or in other units of measure as per the Rules of Procedures and 
Implementation (article 5(3)) 
81Since not all Parties have yet disclosed their minimum annual commitment, it is not possible to comment on 
whether Parties will donate more or less than under previous conventions. Comparisons are complicated further 
by the fact that it is difficult to ascertain hoǁ doŶoƌs͛ ǀalue ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts ǁill ĐoŶǀeƌt iŶ ƋuaŶtities of food 
assistance (i.e. how much food will be possible to purchase with the cash donated) because this will depend 
each year on food prices and on the purchasing power of the currency chosen by donors. 
82See especially the comments and press releases published by TAFAD, The Trans-Atlantic Food Assistance 
Dialogue ͤ http://www.fixturesdesign.com/tafad/about/ͥ and J Hoddinott, M Cohen, and C Barrett (n 14). 
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incorporate options such as payment for the costs of insurance schemes which, as suggested 
by the former Rapporteur on the Right to food, Olivier De Schutter, could provide a new and 
better form of guarantee for food security. 83  
Donating cash is generally regarded very favourably by food security experts. This is 
ďeĐause Đash doŶatioŶs ĐaŶ ďest ƌespoŶd to Ŷeeds assessŵeŶt aŶd to ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ food 
preferences (provided no conditions are attached on where the cash is being spent, see infra). 
The EU, Canada, and Japan provide a mix of commodities and cash, while other donors, the 
United States for example, continue to donate mainly food aid in-kind.  
The list of eligible products is vast and much expanded compared to any other previous 
conventions. IŶ the seǀeŶties͛ aŶd the eighties͛ FACs the list of eligible products comprised 
cereals only. The list was expanded for the first time in 1995 when the new FAC introduced 
non-cereals commodities (namely pulses), included because of pressure by the Australian and 
the Canadian Governments who had pulse surpluses. The 1999 Convention further expanded 
the list to other non-cereal commodities such as dairy and seeds products,84 reflecting both 
the ďƌoadeƌ ƌaŶge of ;suƌplusͿ stoĐks aǀailaďle to doŶoƌs aŶd the ĐoŵpleǆitǇ of ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ 
nutritional needs. The Convention has now included supplementary and therapeutic food, 
ready to use food and tools and other equipment for food preparation.85 
Eligible products have to comply with relevant national policies and legislation of the 
country of operation (article 4.3) and with applicable food safety and quality standards (article 
2 (c)). The reference to national policy and legislation of the country of operation is an 
important innovation introduced by the Convention (previous conventions referred to 
international standards only) which contributes to strengthen the role of beneficiaries in 
doŶoƌs͛ food assistaŶĐe aĐtiǀities and is very important ǁheŶ assessiŶg the ͚adeƋuaĐǇ͛ of the 
food donated (see infra). Beneficiaries concerned that donations do not conform to their 
cultural, religious and social habits –and the negative effects that such donations could have 
(i.e. social discontent, incapacity to fully utilise the food donated, permanent dietary change 
followed by dependency due to incapacity to produce similar food, etc) -  could enact 
legislation that specifically safeguards those habits. Parties to the Conventions that breach 
such legislation would now also breach the international obligations endorsed under the 
Convention. Article 4.3 is important in the context of current debate on Genetically Modified 
food (GM Food). For example, donors who in the past haǀe tƌied to oǀeƌĐoŵe ƌeĐipieŶts͛ ďaŶ 
to GM food aid ǁould Ŷoǁ ďe iŶ ďƌeaĐh of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ if suĐh ďaŶ is paƌt of ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ 
national policies and legislation.  
Finally, Paƌties͛ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ ĐaŶ ďe pƌoǀided ďilateƌallǇ, through international 
organisations and NGOs or through other food assistance partners (which could arguably 
include also private sector parties) but they cannot be donated through other Parties (article 
5.12). The 1999 FAC encouraged members to provide aid through multilateral channels, and 
through the WFP in particular (see article XI (b) of 1999 FAC). The Assistance Convention 
contains no such provision, probably because Parties already channel most of their food 
assistance via the WFP (testament to the important role played by this international 
organisation). 
                                                          
83 See UNCH‘ ͚ The role of development cooperation and food aid in realising the right to adequate food: moving 
from charity to obligation, Report by Special Rapporteur O De Schutter͛ (March 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/005.  
84 In this respect Clay had argued that products under the 1999 FAC covered ǀiƌtuallǇ ͚the eŶtiƌe ƌaŶge of 
commodities and processed foods likely to be provided as humanitarian relief or in nutritional programmes E 
Clay, ͚Future Food Aid or Food Assistance Convention?͛ (ODI Background Paper on Food Aid No. 6, July 2010). 
85 Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure and implementation.  
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2. Parties͛ quomodo obligations: adequate and effective food assistance  
 
The Assistance Convention places great emphasis on what principles Parties should follow 
when providing assistance and how assistance should be provided and delivered. These 
quomodo obligations complement and complete the quantitative commitments and ensure 
that Parties adhere to the primary objective of the Convention to provide adequate, effective 
and culturally acceptable food. The foundations of these obligations are mainly laid down in 
article 2 which is of broad application, i.e. its scope extends beyond the boundaries of the 
minimum commitments, and hence Parties will have to ensure that they respect these 
principles whenever providing food assistance as the article calls on Parties to ͚always adhere 
to these pƌiŶĐiples.͛ Article 2 is then strengthened and complemented by other more detailed 
provisions; these sometimes exclusively apply to assistance provided under the Convention.86  
 
a) Adequacy of assistance: a holistiĐ appƌoaĐh to ͚adeƋuaĐǇ͛? 
 
The concept of adequate food assistance has been developed by international human rights 
instruments that explicitly endorse the right to adequate food and to be free from hunger.87 
͚AdeƋuaĐǇ͛ has also been promoted by the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, 
Professor Olivier De Schutter, who took a holistic approach to this concept defining it as 
assistaŶĐe ǁhiĐh ͚ŵust satisfǇ dietaƌǇ Ŷeeds, takiŶg iŶto aĐĐouŶt the iŶdiǀidual͛s age, liǀiŶg 
conditions, health, occupation [which is]…safe foƌ huŵaŶ ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ aŶd fƌee fƌoŵ adǀeƌse 
substances, such as contaminants from industrial or agricultural processes, including residues 
from pesticides, hormones or veterinary drugs. Adequate food should also be culturally 
acceptable. For example, aid containing food that is a religious or cultural taboo for the 
recipients or inconsistent with their eating habits would not be socially acceptable.88͛ The 
Convention fully endorses this approach via a series of provisions which exhort Parties to 
uphold, when donating assistance, the ͚dignity of beneficiary country͛, to ƌespeĐt theiƌ 
͚Đultuƌal aŶd loĐal dietaƌǇ haďits͛ and to pƌoǀide assistaŶĐe ͚ďased oŶ Ŷeeds aŶd shaƌed 
pƌiŶĐiples͛.89  
Providing ͚adeƋuate, safe aŶd Ŷutƌitious food͛ is one of the major objectives of the 
Convention (article 1(a)). This objective is further elaborated in article 2 via a series of 
provisions setting the principles to which Parties should always conform when granting food 
assistance.90 Thus, Parties are required to target food assistance according to ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ 
nutritional needs and to provide assistance in such a way that avoids dependency and 
                                                          
86 I will specify below when a commitment is of general application and when instead it is limited to the annual 
commitment ͚uŶdeƌ the ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛.  
87For example art 11.1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) The 
content of the right to adequate food has been further clarified by the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultuƌal ‘ights ;CE“C‘Ϳ iŶ GeŶeƌal CoŵŵeŶt No ϭϮ ǁhiĐh states: ͚the ƌight to adeƋuate food is iŶdiǀisiďlǇ 
linked to the inherent dignity of the human person and is indispensable for the fulfilment of other human 
rights enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights͛. See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR), Right to Adequate Food (Art 11)–General Comment 12 UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5 (1999). 
88See ͤ http://www.srfood.org/index.php/en/right-to-foodͥ 
89 Articles 2(d), 2(c)(iii)  and 1(b) respectively. 
90 See for example articles 2(a)(i), 2(a)(ii) 2(a)(iii).  
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protects livelihoods. Parties are also asked to ĐoŶduĐt Đaƌeful assessŵeŶts of ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ 
markets and food preferences when devising their food assistance policies –especially when 
deciding whether to donate cash or food and what type of products to donate. As seen above, 
close collaboration between Parties and beneficiaries and between aid agencies is regarded 
paramount in the Convention and beneficiaries are explicitly exhorted to play a part in the 
design of food security and food assistance policies (see above section 2.A and 2.C).  
BeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ direct participation iŶ the ͚desigŶ͛ of food assistance policies is key to ensure 
these are ͚adeƋuate͛ to fulfil their needs. Important in this context are also the new rules on 
standards analysed above in that Parties are now required to ĐoŶsideƌ ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ food 
policies and standards and are prevented from making donations that contrast with them.    
 
b) Mode of delivery: In grant form, untied and purchased in local or regional markets 
 
The Assistance Convention, as previous conventions before it, encourages Parties to 
provide assistance in grant form and specifies that no less than 80% of the contribution made 
to fulfil annual commitment should be in fully grant form (article 5.7).91 The 1999 FAC also 
estaďlished that, ǁith ƌespeĐt to food aid ĐouŶted agaiŶst a ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt, all food 
aid donated to LDCs had to be provided as grants surprisingly such requirement is not 
endorsed by the new Convention.  
Interestingly, in article 2(a)(vi) the Convention specifies that food aid (for the first time 
distinguished from food assistance) is to be provided iŶ fullǇ gƌaŶt foƌŵ ͚ǁheŶeǀeƌ possiďle.͛ 
As the principles iŶ aƌtiĐle Ϯ aƌe ͚alǁaǇs to ďe applied ďǇ Paƌties͛ (Art 2, first paragraph) the 
obligation to provide food aid as grants extends to donations beyond the minimum 
commitments. It remains unclear however how aid is to be differentiated from assistance.  
 
The Convention, reiterating principles already advocated by previous FACs, commits 
Parties not to use food assistance provided under the Convention as a means for increasing 
exports and distort normal patterns of international trade.92 It then goes beyond any 
convention before, by requiring, in article 2, Parties to (always) provide food assistance in a 
way that does not adversely affect local production, marketing structure and commercial 
trade or the price of essential goods for vulnerable populations.93  
 
The Convention, as the 1999 FAC before, also takes a formal stance against tied aid, 
i.e. aid provided on condition that the food for the aid-financed project are purchased from 
the donor country only. Article 5.9 of the Convention commits Parties to provide assistance 
ǁhiĐh is Ŷot tied ͚diƌeĐtlǇ oƌ iŶdiƌeĐtlǇ, foƌŵallǇ oƌ iŶfoƌŵallǇ, eǆpliĐitlǇ oƌ iŵpliĐitlǇ to 
commercial exports of agricultural products or other goods and services to recipient 
ĐouŶtƌies͛ ;this aƌtiĐle ƌepƌoduĐes, ǁith the saŵe eǆaĐt ǁoƌds, aƌtiĐle IX ;eͿ;iͿ of the ϭϵϵϵ 
FAC). 
For the first time, the Convention extends the commitment to untie assistance to cash 
donations, Parties are now encouraged to ͚iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ pƌoǀide uŶtied Đash-based food 
assistance whenever possiďle aŶd ďased oŶ Ŷeeds͛ ;article 2(b)(iv)). It is worth noting that 
                                                          
91 Development assistance can be donated as grant or concessional sales (also known as soft loans), while grants 
do not need to be repaid concessional sales will need to be paid back by beneficiaries albeit on terms more 
convenient than market prices but which nonetheless involve expenditure for the recipient country.  
92 Art 5.8. 
93 Article 2 (a)(v). This principle always applies whenever Parties donate food assistance. 
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both provisions seem applicable to all food assistance granted by Parties and not just to 
assistance provided to meet minimum annual commitments.94 This is not surprising given that 
the benefits of aid untying are now widely endorsed by the international community; for 
example, increasing the level of aid which is untied figures within the targets of the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on enhancing aid effectiveness. 
A look at the negative effects of tied food aid helps understanding why the Convention 
has extended the commitment to untie aid to all assistance provided, including cash. Tied 
food aid is 30-50% more expensive than food purchased through commercial transactions.95 
Tying often distorts the nature of the aid as the food received by beneficiaries is defined by 
doŶoƌ͛s pƌoduĐtioŶ ;aŶd suƌplusesͿ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ Ŷeeds.  HeŶĐe, doŶatioŶs ƌisk 
being inadequate or culturally and socially unacceptable. Tying food aid is also associated with 
extensive delays in the delivery of the food, delays which can reach up to 62 per cent lost in 
timeliness when compared to local purchased.96  
Despite its negative effects, a staggering 90% of food aid continues to be tied.97 The 
US is the main supplier of in-kind tied food aid, accounting for 89 per cent of all the direct 
transfers.98 The intricate links existing between food aid and trade (including the desire of 
some countries to offset direct agricultural subsidies granted by other parties99) and the 
political barriers encountered at the national level by some Parties, make untying food 
assistance a very contentious issue. Indeed, potent lobbies who gain from the assistance 
being tied exercise enormous pressure on governments and parliaments in donor countries 
to continue to tie aid.100 National and international proposals to untie food aid have 
encountered great opposition in some countries –the US case is emblematic where 
presidential initiatives to untie food aid have consistently been rejected by Congress.101 A 
                                                          
94 Indeed art 5.9 is not limited as instead other obligations in art 5 to minimum commitment only (compare for 
example art 5.9 with art. 5.7) 
95A study by Clay shows that ͚the aĐtual Đost of tied diƌeĐt food aid tƌaŶsfeƌs ǁas, oŶ aǀeƌage, appƌoǆiŵatelǇ 
ϱϬ% ŵoƌe thaŶ loĐal food puƌĐhases aŶd ϯϯ% ŵoƌe ĐostlǇ thaŶ pƌoĐuƌeŵeŶt of food iŶ thiƌd ĐouŶtƌies͛ See E 
Clay, The Development Effectiveness of Food Aid: Does Tying Matter? (OECD, 2005). P Harvey et all  ͚food aid 
aŶd food assistaŶĐe iŶ eŵeƌgeŶĐǇ aŶd tƌaŶsitioŶal ĐoŶteǆt: a ƌeǀieǁ of ĐuƌƌeŶt thiŶkiŶg͛ ;HuŵaŶitaƌiaŶ PoliĐǇ 
Group, 2010) ͤ http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6038.pdfͥ. 
96On the increased timeliness of tied direct transfers see E Lentz, S Passarelli and C Barrett, The Timeliness and 
Cost-Effectiveness of the Local and Regional Procurement of Food Aid (Cornell University, 2012) 
http://www.dyson.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/cbb2/Papers/LRP%20Ch%202%20Lentz%20et%20al.pdf accessed 
1 September 2012. The US Government Accountability Office also found that food from the US is considerably 
slower than food purchased locally or regionally, and required 147 days on average to reach ten selected African 
countries, whereas locally purchased food was available in 35 days, and food procured in neighbouring countries 
in 41 days.͛ See  U“GAO, ͚IŶteƌŶatioŶal food assistaŶĐe: KeǇ issues foƌ ĐoŶgƌessioŶal oǀeƌsight͛ ;UŶited “tates 
Government Accountability Office, 2009) ͤ http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/122649.htmlͥ 
97Clay (n 95). 
98Other donors also use tied food aid, for example Japan and Canada tie 45 per cent and 44 per cent of their 
food aid respectively. Others such the EU, make more use of triangular transactions, Clay ibid 
99During the negotiations for reforming the WTO agreement on agriculture the US has explicitly linked 
negotiations to untie food aid to the abolition of direct subsidies by other WTO members. 
100 Lobbies include agribusiness and shipping corporations, who produce and transport the food, and some NGOs 
(those who sell the food in ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ markets to finance their activities). 
101 During the Bush administration, various attempts were made to change PL 480 and allow 25 per cent of food 
aid allocations to be purchased in developing countries through local and triangular purchases. These, however, 
were not endorsed by the US Congress that in 2005, 2006, and 2007 repeatedly rejected them. See, C Dugger, 
͚PoǀeƌtǇ Meŵo: AfƌiĐaŶ Food foƌ AfƌiĐa͛s “taƌǀiŶg Is ‘oad ďloĐked iŶ CoŶgƌess͛  New York Times, 12 October 
2005, cited in Hoddinott, M Cohen, and C Barrett (n 13). A much more modest reform was instead implemented 
through the setting up of ad hoc programmes. A pilot LRP programme was established by the 2008 Farm Bill, 
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strong international commitment to untie aid could be used by governments to overcome 
political pressure at the national level to tie aid. It is doubtful, however, whether the 
Convention could be able to perform this role. As for the 1999 FAC, many are the problems 
that persist within the Convention hindering the efficacy of the commitment to untie aid.  
The wording used by the Convention remains weak. For example the commitment to 
untie cash donations is written in terms of best efforts endeavours and could easily be 
circumvented by parties. In article Ϯ;ďͿ;iǀͿ Paƌties Đoŵŵit to ͚ iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ pƌoǀide uŶtied Đash-
ďased food assistaŶĐe, ǁheŶeǀeƌ possiďle aŶd ďased oŶ Ŷeeds͛. This is not an outright ban to 
tie cash donations, but rather aŶ eŶdeaǀoƌ to ͚iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ͛ pƌoǀide ŵoƌe uŶtied Đash 
assistaŶĐe ͚ǁheŶeǀeƌ possiďle aŶd ďased oŶ Ŷeeds͛. MaŶǇ ƋuestioŶs Đould ďe ƌaised; for 
example, ǁhat ͚Ŷeeds͛ ǁill ďe takeŶ iŶto aĐĐouŶt? AŶd ǁhose Ŷeeds? Is it the Ŷeeds of the 
population to be helped by the aid, i.e. the starving people, or the need of the local/regional 
market of the recipient country where the (tied) aid will be donated? Or simply the general 
͚Ŷeed͛ to ŵake aid effeĐtiǀe?   
Furthermore, it is arguable that a general commitment to untie aid, even if expressed 
in clear and enforceable terms, cannot alone suffice to prevent Parties from concealing 
discriminatory practices when procuring food. The commitment to ban tied aid can be made 
effective only by enhancing the transparency of the procurement process and putting 
national and international suppliers on equal footing, facilitating competition.102 This is, 
however, not to say that detailed rules on procuring food aid should be introduced but simple 
transparency mechanisms aimed at preventing Parties from concealing discriminatory 
practices could  ensure the effectiveness of the untied provisions. 
In order to understand how the agreement could be improved a comparison could be 
made with the OECD/DAC Recommendation on untying aid to LDCs and HIPCs, a ͚gentlemen 
agreement͛ in the form of a recommendation was adopted in 2002 by OECD/DAC members 
(here and after the Recommendation), and so far this has been the most successful 
international initiative to untie aid, but which unfortunately exempts food aid from its 
coverage (paragraph 8(iii)). The Recommendation͛s strength lies in the fact that, together 
with a clear commitment to untie aid, it provides provisions that enhance transparency when 
purchasing food. For example, the Recommendation sets rules on the notification of tender 
awards and advertising of tender opportunities and it provides for the establishment of a 
website where untied aid offers are advertised, namely the untied bulletin board. The 
bulleting is freely accessible online. The transparency provisions are further complemented 
by the strong monitoring role assigned to the OECD/DAC Committee. A report is published 
each year on the state of implementation of the Recommendation, which contains various 
data and information on contracts notifications and tenders opportunities (for example, the 
number of aid offers advertised and notified to the DAC, the nationality of contractors 
awarded the tenders). The report is also available to the public. Publication of such 
information ensures accountability and encourages peer and public pressure. These few yet 
extremely effective provisions have ensured that over the years aid covered by the 
                                                          
Section 3206 (PL 110-246) which provided the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) with US 60 million dollars 
over four years (financial year 2009–financial year 2012) for LRP. 
102Provisions to ensure transparency and fair participation of foreign suppliers in the procurement process 
include: wide publication of procurement notices and opportunities, adequate time limits to ensure sufficient 
time is allowed between publication of the notice and deadline for participating to the tender, award 
notifications. The literature on this topic is vast. See, for all S Arrowsmith, J Linarelli and S Wallace, Regulating 
Public Procurement (Kluwer Law International, 2000). 
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Recommendation has been de jure and the facto untied. The Convention, in contrast, does 
not foresee similar obligations and remains very weak when confronted with ensuring that 
Parties untie aid de jure and de facto.. For example, it is unclear whether Parties are required 
to disclose the tied/untied status of their commitment in the annual report and whether this 
info will be circulated to the public. Mechanisms similar to those used by the 
Recommendation could be easily put in place under the Convention. For example, the 
Convention could use its newly established website to advertise Paƌties͛ procurement 
opportunities, the availability of such information could allow better monitoring and peer 
ƌeǀieǁ of the fulfilŵeŶt of the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt Ŷot to tie aid. Enhanced 
transparency could incite peer and public pressure and could be a first step towards 
encouraging compliance.103  
 
On a positive note, and linked to the quest to untie food aid, the Assistance 
Convention reinforces previous provisions in the 1999 FAC on local and regional procurement. 
Article 2(b)(iii) on Principles of Food Assistance exhorts Parties to the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ to ͚puƌĐhase 
food and other components of food assistance locally or regionally whenever possible and 
appƌopƌiate.͛ Although the ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to puƌĐhase loĐallǇ oƌ ƌegioŶallǇ is eǆpƌessed iŶ teƌŵs 
of best effort endeavors, the preference for local and regional procurement is clearly 
manifested. This is apparent when comparing this provision to article XII of 1999 FAC oŶ ͚ LoĐal 
Purchases and Triangular Transactions104͛, ǁhiĐh simply required members to ͚giǀe 
ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ͛ to puƌĐhase thƌough local or triangular transaction. The Convention instead 
exhorts Parties to do so and clearly acknowledges that local and regional procurement are 
the best means for purchasing food aid. The EU and the UN make extensive use of local and 
triangular transactions and made the largest contribution of local and triangular purchases in 
the past five years.  
 
c) Other commitments: towards banning Monetisation 
 
Food aid donations are sometimes subjected to the process of monetisation,105 i.e. the food, 
which is provided in-kind from the doŶoƌ͛s ŵaƌket, is sold on the beneficiary market and 
turned into cash by the beneficiary government,106 by NGOs, or by private voluntary 
oƌgaŶisatioŶs ;PVOsͿ. ‹he Đash is theŶ used to fiŶaŶĐe otheƌ deǀelopŵeŶt pƌojeĐts oƌ NGOs͛ 
                                                          
103 Other examples could be made, such as the Convention could have required Parties to provide ex ante and 
ex post information on the procurement opportunities issued each year, together with information on contract 
aǁaƌds; the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s seĐƌetaƌiat Đould peƌfoƌŵ the ŵoŶitoƌiŶg ƌole uŶdeƌtakeŶ ďǇ the DAC iŶ ƌespeĐt of 
the OECD Recommendation. 
104 Art XII of the 1999 FAC stated: ͚(a) In order to promote local agricultural development, strengthen regional 
and local markets and enhance the longer-term food security of recipient countries, members shall give 
consideration to using or directing their cash contributions for the purchase of food: (i) for supply to the 
ƌeĐipieŶt ĐouŶtƌǇ fƌoŵ otheƌ deǀelopiŶg ĐouŶtƌies ;͚tƌiaŶgulaƌ tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs͛Ϳ; oƌ, ;iiͿ iŶ oŶe paƌt of a deǀelopiŶg 
ĐouŶtƌǇ foƌ supplǇ to a defiĐit aƌea iŶ that ĐouŶtƌǇ ;͚loĐal puƌĐhases͛Ϳ. ;...Ϳ͛ 
105 The process of monetization is involved when aid is granted as programme food aid. The WFP defines it as 
͚food aid pƌoǀided oŶ a goǀeƌŶŵeŶt-to-government basis. It is not targeted at specific beneficiary groups. It is 
sold on the open market and can be provided either as a grant or as a loaŶ͛. WFP, Food aid information system, 
www.wfp.org 
106 Donors and beneficiaries often reach an agreement on how the money generated by the food aid sold 
should be used. 
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activities in the targeted beneficiary country. In 2006, NGOs sold 30% of all the food aid they 
handled on the open market in recipient countries.107 
The process of monetization started originally as ͚partial monetization,͛ developed in 
order to generate funds to complete the implementation (including internal transport) of a 
food aid operation. However ͚paƌtial ŵoŶetizatioŶ͛ was then extended to the so-called 
practice of ͚full ŵoŶetisatioŶ͛ ǁheƌeďǇ soŵe doŶoƌs ;the U“ foƌ example via its development 
aid agency, USAID under Title II of PL 480) provide NGOs with commodities available on the 
doŶoƌ͛s ŵaƌket (surpluses) for them to sell on the market of the recipient country. 
The process of monetisation has been highly criticised. Experts have proved that the 
monetization of food aid has disastrous consequences on the local market where it is sold 
since it displaces local production, driving local farmers out of business.  
In line with recent findings on the negative effects of food aid monetization, the 
Convention requires Parties to limit the use of this practice to cases ͚ǁheƌe theƌe is aŶ 
ideŶtified Ŷeed to do so, aŶd to iŵpƌoǀe the food seĐuƌitǇ of ǀulŶeƌaďle populatioŶs͛. 
Moreover the Convention requires food aid ŵoŶetizatioŶ to ďe ďased oŶ ͚tƌaŶspaƌeŶt aŶd 
oďjeĐtiǀe ŵaƌket aŶalǇsis͛ aŶd to ͚aǀoid ĐoŵŵeƌĐial displaĐeŵeŶt͛ ;article 2(b)(5). However, 
this provision still fails to convince. For example, nothing is said concerning who should 
conduct the market analysis -should it be conducted by a third independent body or by the 
same organisation that will benefit from the monetisation? If the market analysis is conducted 
by the same NGO that benefits from the monetisation then there is a risk of bias. In this 
authoƌ͛s ǀieǁ, the Convention should have inserted an express requirement to rely on market 
analysis conducted by external (third) parties. The use of in-house analysis should be 
permitted only where no external market analysis is available. The WFP, for example, 
conducts numerous market analyses all over the world, reference to the WFP analysis could 
be an easy and fast way to ensure that monetization is used only where no adverse effect is 
created in the local market.  
 
d) Corollary obligations: reducing associated costs 
 
Article 2(b)(i) of the Assistance Convention ƌeƋuiƌes Paƌties to ͚ŵiŶiŵise assoĐiated Đosts as 
ŵuĐh as possiďle͛ iŶ oƌdeƌ to ͚increase the amount available to spend on food and to promote 
effiĐieŶĐǇ͛. Associated costs are those connected to activities necessary to provide and deliver 
the assistance, for example transportation, procurement, storage.108 These costs can be very 
high, especially when donors attach conditions to these activities that make them more 
burdensome and expensive, for example when donors require that the food donated is 
shipped by nationally-registered vessels.109 This is, for example, the case for most US food 
aid.110  
                                                          
107FAO, Responding to the food crisis: synthesis of medium-term measures proposed in inter-agency assessments 
(Rome, FAO, 2009) available at: www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ISFP/SR_Web.pdf accessed 1 September 
2012. 
108 Rule 2 of Rules of procedures 
109 See Lentz (n 96) 
110US legislation (PL 480) requires that 75% of USAID and 50% of USDA managed food aid be transported in 
͞flag-ĐaƌƌǇiŶg͟ ǀessels ƌegisteƌed iŶ the U“. HaƌǀeǇ et al (n 95). such conditions are also cause of further 
inefficiencies for example donors subject to tied transportation requirements cannot make use of more 
effiĐieŶt ŵeaŶs of puƌĐhase, suĐh as puƌĐhasiŶg food oŶ the loĐal aŶd ƌegioŶal ŵaƌket. As U“GAO Ŷoted, ͚as 
long as US law requires 75 per cent of American food to be shipped on US flag vessels, the ability to use Local 
23 
 
It was the 1999 FAC that first allowed associated costs to count towards the fulfilment of 
the minimum annual commitments.111 This possibility was given to reduce tensions between 
donors who faced high associated Đosts aŶd those ǁho didŶ͛t. Foƌ eǆaŵple, between donors 
covering emergencies in remote areas (such as Rwanda) and having to cover the overland 
transport from the port of discharge to the border of the recipient country and others who 
operated in much cheaper operation areas (the transportation costs could not be claimed 
against the FAC commitments, which were computed exclusively on the bases of the food 
received by the beneficiary). Allowing donors to count associated costs towards their 
commitment was also a way to ensure that beneficiaries were not asked to pay for the 
transport costs of the food donated. A drawback of this provision is that the more is spent on 
these costs the less will be spent on the assistance itself (yet the convention obligations will 
be fulfilled).  
The 1999 CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s approach to associated costs exposed one of the major contrasts 
in aid donations in the nineties, namely the greater attention paid to doŶoƌs͛ Đosts ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
to ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ food iŶseĐuƌitǇ Ŷeeds. The new commitment to reduce associated costs is 
therefore a welcome innovation. Its language however remains vague and more could have 
been done to ensure associated costs are not unreasonably inflated. For example the 
Convention could have expressly forbidden Parties to impose conditions that increase 
associated costs (such as requiring that the food is shipped by nationally registered vessels) 
or could have inserted a cap above which associated costs cannot be counted towards the 
commitments.  
 
3. Beneficiaries of Assistance 
 
Food assistance can be directed towards eligible countries (which are all countries listed as 
recipient of Official Development Assistance by the OECD/DAC) and, now, towards eligible 
vulnerable populations in any such country (Art 4). The inclusion of vulnerable populations in 
the category of beneficiaries of food assistance is welcome considering the tension and 
conflicts which sometimes exist between the official Government and vulnerable/minority 
groups. By selecting vulnerable populations as recipients of assistance the Convention has 
endorsed the HR argument that people and individuals are the right holders of the right to 
food. In so doing it has also legitimized the practices of many aid agencies who already provide 
direct assistance to vulnerable population. 
 
 
4. Effectiveness of the endorsed obligations.  
 
e) Unfulfilled commitments, information-sharing, monitoring and accountability  
 
As in previous conventions, unfulfilled commitments can be the cause of disputes among 
Parties. Disputes are resolved by the FA Committee (article 11). However, because the 
                                                          
and regional purchase will ĐoŶtiŶue to ďe ĐoŶstƌaiŶed͛. U“GAO, ͚IŶteƌŶatioŶal food assistaŶĐe: KeǇ issues foƌ 
ĐoŶgƌessioŶal oǀeƌsight͛ ;DC, UŶited “tates GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt AĐĐouŶtaďilitǇ OffiĐe, ϮϬϬϵͿ 
111 Art III (f) expressly allowed members to count associated costs towards their commitments. However art III(g) 
of the ϭϵϵϵ FAC pƌoǀided that ͚iŶ ƌespeĐt of tƌaŶspoƌt aŶd otheƌ opeƌatioŶal Đosts, a ŵeŵďeƌ ĐaŶŶot ĐouŶt ŵoƌe 
than the acquisition cost of eligible products towards its commitment, except in the case of internationally 
recogŶised eŵeƌgeŶĐǇ situatioŶs͛ suĐh pƌoǀisioŶ is Ŷot ƌeiteƌated iŶ the Ŷeǁ ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶ. 
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Committee decides by consensus (article 7), any Party, including the Party who has not 
fulfilled its obligations, can block the adoption of an (adverse) decision by the Committee.112 
As in previous FACs, no sanctions are foreseen if Parties do not fulfil their minimum annual 
commitments.113 Critics have argued that the lack of strong enforcement mechanisms 
ǁeakeŶs the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s ĐapaĐitǇ to aĐt as a guaƌaŶtee foƌ food seĐuƌitǇ aŶd encourages 
food aid donations to be volatile and pro-cyclical.114 While one can object to this criticism by 
noting that peer pressure can, and has worked well in the past, in resolving members to fulfil 
their commitments, the lack of sanctions has compromised the public resonance of those 
complaints.  
Although the Convention has not introduced new rules on sanctions, it has 
strengthened (or attempts to) its peer and public pressure mechanisms. In particular, for the 
first time, it requires Parties to provide annual reports to the Secretariat on the fulfilment of 
their obligations. 115 The reports will be available on a website maintained by the Secretariat 
and accessible to Parties. 116 
Hoǁ effeĐtiǀe these ƌepoƌts ǁill ďe iŶ eŶsuƌiŶg ŵoŶitoƌiŶg of Paƌties͛ oďligatioŶ aŶd 
enhancing peer and public pressure will depend on the amount and quality of the information 
available and on the widespread availability of that information. Both elements remain at the 
moment weak.  
For instance, it is unclear what information will be included in the reports and, 
although guidance is provided by Rule 9 of the Rules of Procedures and Implementations, 
interpretative gaps still remain. Parties retain considerable discretion on what information to 
provide as only information strictly related to the quantum of Paƌties͛ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts is to be 
disclosed,117 while information on the quomodo of their commitments (i.e. whether aid is 
tied, whether the food was monetised etc.) or on the impact of the assistance (i.e. was the 
assistance suffiĐieŶt to ŵeet ƌeĐipieŶts͛ needs? Did it meet ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ staŶdaƌds, etc) 
continues to be optional.118 This is unfortunate as it is essential to understand such 
information if Parties are to ŵeet the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s oďjeĐtiǀes and to enhance the 
effectiveness of peer pressure. Disclosing such information is also vital for developing best 
                                                          
112 Dissent can be expressed at a formal session or within thirty days after the circulation of the minutes of a 
formal session recording the proposed decisions concerned. Further it needs to be remembered that non-Parties 
to the Convention –ie. Beneficiaries of assistance or other interested stakeholders such as NGOs- will not be 
allowed to raise complaints. This is bound to result in fewer disputes being brought in front of the Committee 
than if beneficiaries were also allowed to raise complaints. 
113 ‹he CoŶǀeŶtioŶ oŶlǇ ƌeƋuiƌes that ͚the uŶfulfilled aŵouŶt shall ďe added to the PaƌtǇ͛s ŵiŶiŵuŵ aŶŶual 
ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt foƌ the folloǁiŶg Ǉeaƌ͛ uŶless the FA Coŵŵittee deĐides otheƌǁise (art 5.13). As in the past a five 
per cent cap is imposed on the excess quantities of donation that can be transposed from one year to the next 
Art 5.14 of the Convention. Thus, if a member contribution in one given year exceeded its minimum annual 
commitment (for example because of excess food production and/or low prices), no more than five per cent of 
the excess assistance could be carried forward to the following year. 
114This issue was first raised against the 1999 FAC. For an extensive discussion of the 1999 FAC see Hoddinott et 
al (n13).  
115 Although previous conventions encouraged members to exchange information on their food aid 
programmes and on the fulfilment of their obligations, no systematic mechanisms was in place to sure 
information was timely shared amongst Parties. See in particular Art XIV of the 1999 FAC. 
116Art 6 of the Convention. Annual Reports need to be submitted within ninety days of the end of the calendar 
year. 
117 i.e. how much (in quantities of wheat equivalent and/or value) and what type of products/activities are 
provided 
118 ‹he laŶguage of ‘ule ϵ is eǆpliĐit iŶ ƌeƋuiƌiŶg that oŶlǇ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ƌelated to the ƋuaŶtuŵ of Paƌties͛ 
obligatioŶs ͚should͛ ďe iŶĐluded, ǁhile all otheƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ͚ŵaǇ͛ ďe iŶĐluded iŶ the ƌepoƌt.   
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practices –one of the declared objectives of the Convention.119 It seems that the Secretariat 
is to develop a template to be followed by all Parties but no further information has yet been 
officially released. On a positive note, it is important that in their reports Parties are now 
required to describe the circumstances for the failure to fulfil their obligations (article 5.13). 
AŶotheƌ poiŶt to highlight is that Paƌties͛ aŶŶual ƌepoƌts aƌe aǀailaďle on a website 
which is accessible only to other Parties. Non-Parties can only have access to summaries of 
such reports iŶ the FA Coŵŵittee͛s aŶŶual ƌepoƌt. The Convention does not specify what 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ the FA Coŵŵittee͛s aŶŶual ƌepoƌt has to include, in fact the content of the annual 
reports is still a contentious issue within the FA Committee and subject to continuous 
negotiations . The first two reports by the FA Committee were published in October  2014 and 
July 2015. Both the 2014 and the 2015 reports iŶĐlude Paƌties͛ minimum annual commitments 
for the preceding year, all expressed in value terms;120 they also include a suŵŵaƌǇ of Paƌties͛ 
annual reports (ǁhiĐh shoǁĐases Paƌties͛ ŵajoƌ opeƌatioŶs aŶd iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs foƌ the year of 
reporting) and a summary of the activities of the Committee. The 2015 report is more 
informative than the 2014 report as it contains, for the first time, information on general 
trends on in-kind food aid, on nutrition interventions, on local and regional procurement. The 
2015 report also includes details of legislative reforms taking place in some countries, such as 
the US, which comply with the Convention, demonstrating that the Convention is having a 
direct iŵpaĐt oŶ Paƌties͛ food assistaŶĐe poliĐies. However information is still very 
approximate121 and not all Parties disclose details of their food aid operations or provide data 
on how aid is provided.122 These limits notwithstanding, the efforts of the chair of the FA 
Committee to expand the information included in the annual report need to be praised and 
welcomed as an important innovation which it is hoped will be maintained and strengthened 
in the future. 
It is evident that limiting the availability of detailed annual reports to Parties only will 
significantly constrain the role that interested stakeholders, and the public at large, could play 
as vectors of accountability and public pressure. It is submitted that Paƌties͛ aŶŶual ƌepoƌts 
should be widely available so that public accountability and pressure can be enhanced. 
Finally, for the first time Paƌties ͚ŵaǇ Ŷoǁ pƌopose aŶ assessŵeŶt of the ƌeleǀaŶĐe of 
this CoŶǀeŶtioŶ…͛ (article 16). However, it is unclear how this assessment should be 
conducted, on what basis and by whom. For example will it be conducted externally? Will it 
include information on the effectiveness of the Convention (for example if Parties meet their 
obligations123)? It is too early to know how this provision will be interpreted and whether a 
Party will ever propose such assessment.   
                                                          
119 AƌtiĐle Ϯ eŶĐouƌages paƌties to ͚ŵoŶitoƌ, eǀaluate aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate oŶ a ƌegulaƌ ďasis the outĐoŵes aŶd 
impact of food assistance activities in order to further deǀelop ďest pƌaĐtiĐes aŶd ŵaǆiŵise theiƌ effeĐtiǀeŶess͛ 
120 The 2014 report expresses commitments for each Party in local currencies only and it does not show the 
USD equivalent for each commitment making comparisons between donors extremely difficult. Fortunately 
the pƌoďleŵ has ďeeŶ addƌessed the folloǁiŶg Ǉeaƌ ǁith ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts eǆpƌessed iŶ ďoth doŶoƌs͛ loĐal 
currencies and in USD.  
121 For example it is reported that in kind products represent approximately 76% of food assistance provided 
by FAC members, nutrition intervention to approximately 5% etc. 
122 Some donors provide more information than others. The US for examples provides data on the percentage 
of local, triangular and in-kind food aid, of cash transfers and vouchers. Japan, in contrast, does not provide 
any such information. Other Parties only provide limited and selective information, for instance it is mentioned 
in the summary report for Switzerland that in 2014 Switzerland donated Swiss dried skimmed milk as in-kind 
food aid which is indicative that Swiss aid was tied.   
123 See for all criticism of previous FAC and suggestions for reforms by Hoddinott et al (n13) 
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No other monitoring mechanism is provided by the Convention.124 As with the 
previous conventions no ƌegulaƌ aŶd sǇsteŵatiĐ assessŵeŶt of Paƌties͛ obligations is 
conducted by the FA Committee or by any external Body to verify that Parties have complied 
with their obligations.125  
In conclusion, the Convention places greater emphasis than ever before on enhancing 
information-sharing, transparency and monitoring. By requiring Parties to publish annual 
reports on the way they have fulfilled the Convention objectives and principles it has 
introduced an unprecedented mechanism to enhance transparency and reinforce the role 
that peer and public pressure could play in ensuring that members respect their obligations. 
Besides, peer and public pressures could relive Parties from political pressure exercised at the 
national level by the potent lobbies that gain from food assistance and should therefore be 
encouraged. However, it remains so far unclear what information the Convention new 
transparency mechanisms will contain and how accessible they will be for non-Parties and for 
the public. In order to ensure that these mechanisms work, data on the status of Parties͛ 
implementation of the Convention need to be transparent and easily accessible to donors and 
beneficiaries, to practitioners and to the public at large.  
 
3. AN UNEXPECTED TWIST: THE REFERENCE TO THE WTO  
 
During the process of negotiating the Convention, questions were raised concerning the 
opportunity to strengthen the links between the Convention and other international 
institutions also dealing with aid, food aid and more generally food security. For example, 
discussions had started over whether to move the FAC secretariat to Paris, under the remit 
of the OECD/DAC,126 or to move it to Rome where the FAO and the WFP could have staffed a 
joined secretariat for the FA Committee, the CSSD, and WFP/INTERFAIS.127 Others suggested 
that reinforced cooperation lines should have been developed between the FAC and the 
newly established Committee on World Food Security.128 However, these suggestions have 
not been taken up by the negotiators and the institutional settings of the Convention 
                                                          
124 The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Professor Oliver De Schutter, also indicated that one way for 
iŵpƌoǀiŶg the ŵoŶitoƌiŶg sǇsteŵs ǁithiŶ the FAC aŶd eŶsuƌe that doŶoƌs do Ŷot ǀiolate ƌeĐipieŶts͛ ƌight to food, 
would be to recur to external observers. See O. De Schutter (n 83) 
125 In contrast for example the OECD/DAC Recommendation on untying aid to LDC and HIPC reserves to the 
OECD/DAC committee the ƌole of ŵoŶitoƌiŶg aŶd eǀaluatiŶg ͚͚all aspeĐts͛͛ of the agreement, via three 
mechanisms: the AŶŶual ‘epoƌts, the Peeƌ ‘eǀieǁs of iŶdiǀidual DAC Meŵďeƌs, aŶd a ͚͚ĐoŵpƌeheŶsiǀe 
eǀaluatioŶ͛͛ oŶ the effeĐtiǀeŶess of the ‘eĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ to be published periodically. A similar approach could 
have been followed under the Convention.   
126 This solution was advocated to improve the overall transparency of food assistance and align food aid 
policies to those adopted for aid in general See E Clay ͚A Futuƌe Food Aid oƌ Food AssistaŶĐe CoŶǀeŶtioŶ?͛ 
(Overseas Development Institute Background Paper 6, June 2010) 
ͤhttp://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4941.pdfͥ. The major disadvantage of this proposal is that the 
OECD is donors-driven so the agƌeeŵeŶt ǁould ƌeŵaiŶ a doŶoƌs͛ Đluď. Fuƌtheƌ soŵe FAC ŵeŵďeƌs aƌe Ŷot 
OECD/DAC members (such as Argentina) therefore special arrangements would need to be put in place. To this 
end Clay suggests the establishment of a DAC-plus group.  
127 This would have enabled to gain from the specialised expertise of these institutions and to better 
coordinate the work of the various bodies dealing with food assistance. 
128 see Clapp and Clark (n 1516Ϳ ǁho aƌgue that ͚Relocating the FAC to a Rome-based structure linked to existing 
UN bodies would resolve many governance input issues, but it is likely that the current member-state donors of 
the FAC would not be comfortable giving recipient countries and civil organizations any say in negotiating their 
food aid ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts͛ ;footŶotes oŵittedͿ. 
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remained unchanged with the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s “eĐƌetaƌiat ďased iŶ LoŶdoŶ aŶd housed ďǇ the 
committee on surplus disposal.129  
The relationship between the Convention and those institutions such as the FAO, the 
WFP, the CSSD, that historically have dealt with food insecurity, have left unchanged by the 
Convention, which continues to operate distinctively from those institutions -coordination 
and collaboration is limited, as discussed above, to the possibility of inviting those institutions 
as observers to the meetings of the FA Committee. Instead, a significant change has been 
introduced iŶ ƌespeĐt to the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s ƌelatioŶship ǁith another prominent international 
organisation, namely the WTO. Breaking from the past, the Convention now makes explicit 
reference to the WTO obligations. In the pƌeaŵďle it affiƌŵs Paƌties͛ deteƌŵiŶed intention to 
͚aĐt iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith theiƌ W‹O oďligatioŶs͛ ;pƌeaŵďleͿ aŶd, ŵost sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ, iŶ Article 3, 
titled Relationship with the WTO Agreements,  specifies that: 
  
 ͚Ŷothing in this Convention shall derogate from any existing or future WTO 
obligations applicable between Parties. In case of conflict between such 
obligations and this Convention, the former shall prevail. Nothing in this 
Convention will prejudice the positions that a Party may adopt in any 
negotiations in the WTO (emphasis added).  
 
It was mentioned in the first section that negotiations for renewing the 1999 FAC were 
postponed to await the conclusion of the WTO Doha round of negotiations.130  When these 
negotiations stalled negotiations for a new FAC resumed and the Assistance Convention was 
adopted, but the WTO continued to cast an important shadow on the Convention.  
Article 3 certainly reflects the international background under which the Convention was 
negotiated and adopted, i.e. the WTO negotiations had not been concluded yet and Parties 
did not want to hamper their negotiating positions within the WTO development round.131 
Possibly without this clause the Convention would not have been adopted. This provision also 
signals that the problems raised by the trade-distorting effects of food assistance continue to 
be a major issue for Parties and that the WTO is the preferred forum to solve those issues. 
Yet article 3 could have significant implications for the regulation and the governance system 
of food assistaŶĐe, iŵpliĐatioŶs that go ďeǇoŶd safeguaƌdiŶg paƌties͛ ŶegotiatiŶg positioŶs 
within the WTO. Indeed, by proclaiming the supremacy of WTO rules over those of the 
Convention, article 3 changes and inverts the previous relationship between the FAC and the 
WTO: while in the past it was for the WTO to refer to the FAC132 and to recognise the 
                                                          
129 Coordination with other international institutions is maintained in the limited form of granting observer 
status to other international organisations willing to participate to the FA Committee meetings (see above). 
130The WTO negotiations started in 2001 and are built upon three main categories (or pillars): market access—
aimed at reducing tariffs for agricultural products and reaching agreements on opening up trade in agriculture 
for products currently not covered by the agreement; domestic support—aimed at the elimination of subsidies 
to national farmers; and export competition—aimed at the elimination of any form of subsidies for the export 
of national products. Negotiations on food aid are taking place within the export competition pillar which also 
includes direct export subsidies, export credits, state trading enterprises and food aid. Hence, the WTO 
negotiations on food aid are closely interrelated with the negotiations taking place in other sectors of the AoA. 
“ee J Clapp, ͚W‹O AgƌiĐultuƌe NegotiatioŶs: IŵpliĐatioŶs foƌ the Gloďal “outh͛ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ Ϯϳ Third World Quarterly 
563 and also Clapp (n 5)). C Hanrahan and C Canada, ͚IŶteƌŶatioŶal Food Aid: U.“. aŶd Otheƌ DoŶoƌ͛ 
(Congressional Research Service, 2011) 
131Parties to the Assistance convention are also WTO members 
132For example Art 10 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture see above (n 9) 
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importance of its rules, the Convention͛s pƌoǀisioŶs aƌe Ŷoǁ suďoƌdiŶated to the WTO, 
assigning a new hierarchy to the rules of the two agreements.  
What is also especially surprising is the fact that the Convention does not limit the supremacy 
of the WTO provisions to conflicts that might arise on the trade-related aspects of food 
assistance (and so between the rules in the Convention that deals with the trade-related 
aspect of food aid and the same rules in the WTO) but it extends the supremacy of the WTO 
to aŶǇ ĐoŶfliĐt that ŵight aƌise ďetǁeeŶ the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s aŶd the W‹O͛s ƌules, thus 
potentially also including non-trade related aspects of food aid (for example those strictly 
related to humanitarian/food security issues). What are the implications of such an inverted 
hierarchy aŶd the ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes oŶ the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s oďjeĐtiǀes? Could they be jeopardised 
by the supremacy of the WTO provisions? 
 
PƌoĐlaiŵiŶg the supƌeŵaĐǇ of W‹O ƌules oǀeƌ the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s ƌules could opeŶ a PaŶdoƌa͛s 
Box of questions and problems linked to criticisms often raised against the WTO. The WTO 
has been blamed for being disproportionately geared towards the economic and trade 
interests of its developed country members133 and for not taking sufficiently into account 
deǀelopiŶg ĐouŶtƌies͛ developmental and human rights concerns.134 These issues are 
especially contentious in the context of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture whose provisions 
have been regarded as an unfortunate compromise between the different and complex 
interests at stake within the agricultural sector.135 The complexity of such conflicts, and the 
tension and contrasts which persist between WTO members in this sector, is confirmed by 
the difficulties encountered during the negotiations for the renewal of the agreement - 
negotiations which to date have not been concluded and which remain a major obstacle to a 
satisfactory conclusion of the WTO Development Round. However, reaching the conclusion 
(solely on the base of this criticism) that article 3 is a negative and unnecessary innovation 
brought about by the Convention is premature.136 The negotiations for the renewal of the 
                                                          
133 This criticism has not been sedated despite the ͚deǀelopŵeŶt ageŶda͛ ďeĐaŵe a top pƌioƌitǇ foƌ the W‹O 
Doha ƌouŶd of ŶegotiatioŶs aŶd the ͚pƌoŵotioŶ of deǀelopŵeŶt͛ the ͚Đoƌe ďusiŶess of the ŵultilateƌal tƌadiŶg 
sǇsteŵ͛, P “uďedi, ͚‹he ‘oad fƌoŵ Doha: the Issues foƌ the DeǀelopŵeŶt ‘ouŶd of the W‹O aŶd the Future of 
IŶteƌŶatioŶal ‹ƌade͛ ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ϱϮ International and Comparative Law Quarterly 425; Y-S Lee, Reclaiming 
Development in the World Trading System (Cambridge University Press 2007). ‘ H Wade, ͚What stƌategies aƌe 
viable for developing countries todaǇ? ‹he Woƌld ‹ƌade OƌgaŶizatioŶ aŶd the shƌiŶkiŶg of ͚deǀelopŵeŶt spaĐe͛͛, 
(2003) 10(4) Review of International Political Economy 621; S Devadoss, ͚WhǇ do deǀelopiŶg ĐouŶtƌies ƌesist 
gloďal tƌade agƌeeŵeŶts?͛ ;ϮϬϬϲͿ ϭϱ The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 191; D 
Alessandrini, Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trade Regime: The Failure and Promise of the WTO's 
Development Mission (Hart 2010). 
134See for example exponents of the so-Đalled ͚ tƌade aŶd deďate͛ oƌ ͚ tƌade liŶkage͛ deďate. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ P NiĐhols, 
͚‹ƌade ǁithout Values͛ ;ϭϵϵϲͿ ϵϬ North-western University L. Rev ϲϱϴ; ‘ Hoǁse aŶd M Mutua, ͚ PƌoteĐtiŶg HuŵaŶ 
Rights in a Global Economy: ChalleŶges foƌ the Woƌld ‹ƌade OƌgaŶisatioŶ͛ ;iŶteƌŶatioŶal CeŶtƌe foƌ HuŵaŶ ‘ights 
and Democratic Developmen, Policy Paper, 2002). The frame of this criticism has been challenged in recent years 
and a new interpretative model has been proposed to engage with the debate over the objectives and scope of 
͚fƌee tƌade,͛ of the W‹O aŶd ǁith the fuŶdaŵeŶtal ƋuestioŶ of ͚ǁhat fƌee tƌade ĐaŶ aŶd should ŵeaŶ͛ “ee A 
LaŶg, ͚‘efleĐtiŶg oŶ LiŶkage: CogŶitiǀe aŶd IŶstitutioŶal ChaŶge iŶ the IŶteƌŶatioŶal ‹ƌadiŶg “Ǉsteŵ' (2007) 70(4) 
Modern Law Review 523, and A Lang World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic 
Order (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
135Y-S Lee (n 132) at 107-114. 
136 One of the criticisms raised by Lang towards the ͚tƌade aŶd͛ deďate is that ͚…it is pƌeĐiselǇ this ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ 
[of laďouƌ as a ͚ŶoŶ-tƌade issue͛] ǁhiĐh the liŶkage deďate teŶds to peƌpetuate, by treating the conceptual 
separation of ͚tƌade͛ aŶd ͚laďouƌ͛ issues as self-evident, natural and given. The debate perpetuates a conceptual 
framework within which arguments of the kind Ruggiero proposes [ie the WTO cannot drift away from its trade 
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AoA have not been concluded and it is too early to know what conflicts, if any, might arise 
between the Convention and the new AoA, and how they will be solved. On the contrary, it 
could be said that the presence of article 3 in the Convention brings to the fore the 
intertwined nature of these two systems of norms (ie the FAC and the WTO) and the necessity 
to initiate a dialogue between these two institutional fora. Furthermore, when (and if) the 
process of the WTO negotiations on agriculture will be resumed, awareness of the new WTO 
͚supƌeŵaĐǇ͛ oǀeƌ the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s ƌules might put pressure on WTO members who are 
Parties to the Convention to have regard foƌ the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s food seĐuƌitǇ oďjeĐtiǀes and to 
ensure that the CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s oďjeĐtiǀes aƌe ƌespeĐted aŶd Ŷot uŶdeƌŵiŶed ďǇ the W‹O ƌules. 
Ultimately, this could instigate a more constructive debate on how to address food security 
within the WTO if only by engaging more commentators and actors in this debate.137 This 
dialogue will be further strengthened by the fact that the W‹O͛s goǀeƌŶaŶĐe sǇsteŵ is, 
differently from the Convention, inclusive of developing countries who will also have the 
chance to influence the WTO policies on food aid. 
 
What shape the WTO policies will take remains to be seen. The WTO negotiations on food 
aid aƌe still suďstaŶtiallǇ ͚opeŶ͛ if oŶe ďelieǀes that a Ŷeǁ W‹O agƌeeŵeŶt oŶ agƌiĐultuƌe ǁill 
ever be agreed. In Bali, at the ninth WTO Ministerial Conference (December 2013), WTO 
members failed to adopt any new measure on food aid.138 Until a new agreement is adopted 
the Convention remains the principal international legal instrument to regulate food 
assistance.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The adoption in 2012 of the Food Assistance Convention is the first major attempt to 
modernise the rules applicable to international food assistance and to address the criticism 
raised against the previous architecture of food aid regulation. More than any convention 
before it, it places food security at the heart of Paƌties͛ oďligatioŶs. The message delivered by 
the Convention is powerful: food security interests should prevail when devising the 
ŵodalities foƌ gƌaŶtiŶg assistaŶĐe aŶd should alǁaǇs guide Paƌties͛ aĐtioŶs oŶ food assistaŶĐe. 
Better than any convention before, it enhances the role played by beneficiaries and by non-
Parties to the Convention, it goes beyond the mere specification of minimum commitments 
                                                          
vocation and cannot offer solution for non-trade issue] are persuasive and are deployed to legitimise the current 
shape of tƌadiŶg iŶstitutioŶs.͛ “ee LaŶg ;Ŷ ϭϯϯ). Following this it could be argued that one should not frame the 
discussion on article 3 of the Convention in terms of supremacy of trade over food security.  
137 Food security has mainly been dealt by institutions within the UN system. Food security experts have 
reluctantly engaged with the WTO literature. Article 3 has brought to the attention of the FA Committee, of the 
Parties of the Convention and of all food security and food aid commentators, the importance of WTO rules for 
food security, now requiring engagement with those rules. 
138 See above (n19). The 2008 modalities on agriculture at art 10.4 dealt extensively with the trade-related 
aspects of food aid, proposing stricter rules to prevent WTO members using food aid as an export tool. In Bali 
WTO members focused instead solely on transparency of food aid donations, the Draft Ministerial Declaration 
on the export competition pillar of the AoA, agreed on 3/12/2013 titled Elements for Enhanced Transparency on 
Export Competition requires WTO members to provide the following information on food aid: ͚1. Product 
description; 2. Quantity and/or value of food aid provided; 3. Description of whether food aid is provided on in-
kind, untied cash-based basis and whether monetisation was permitted; 4. Description of whether in fully grant 
form or concessional terms; 5. Description of relevant needs assessment (and by whom) and whether food aid 
is responding to a declaration of emergency or an emergency appeal (and by whom); 6. Description of whether 
re-export of food aid is an option under the terms of the provision of food aid.͛ 
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of food aid donations to include extensive principles and rules on the way the assistance 
should be donated. The Convention sets clear commitments to make the assistance adequate, 
suitable and effectiǀe to ŵeet ďeŶefiĐiaƌies͛ Ŷeeds aŶd to minimise the potential distortive 
effects of food assistance imposing strict boundaries on the use of the assistance as a means 
of export promotion. Doubts no longer exist on what the best approach to enhance the 
effectiveness food assistance is and how Parties should grant that assistance. The expansion 
of its coverage, from quantum to quomodo of Paƌties͛ oďligations, has bolstered the 
CoŶǀeŶtioŶ͛s iŵpoƌtaŶĐe. The Convention is the manifesto of food assistance; it sets 
benchmarks for all donors to follow when providing food assistance and is relevant when 
assessiŶg doŶoƌs͛ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe. Following the stream of its predecessors, the Convention 
breaks with the legal lassaiz-fair that characterises the aid sector in general and the 
assumption that aid is a charitable activity and donors can freely choose what, if and when to 
donate.  
However, as explained above, the Convention is far from being a perfect agreement. 
Problems still persist with many of its provisions and in particular with its monitoring and 
review mechanisms. The Convention remains weak when called to warrant that Parties fulfil 
their commitments. The role played by interested stakeholders and by the public at large 
should be enhanced so that pressure can be exercised on Parties to respect their 
obligations.139 The way Parties set and can now modify their commitments on a yearly basis 
should also be reformed and Parties should be required to make multiyear commitments so 
that predictability of food resources can be ensured (for a summary of the major issues see 
Table 1).    
Yet notwithstanding the problems identified here, the Convention remains a vital 
instrument to ensure food security for all. The Convention, like the FACs before, sets 
principles, rules and obligations that are legal in nature and for which Parties can be held 
accountable.140 In its absence, states͛ oďligatioŶ to assist ĐouŶtƌies iŶ Ŷeed ƌeŵaiŶs ;alŵost 
entirely) at their discretion. The Convention is the only agreement that addresses the many 
facets of food assistance and this is likely to remain the case for a long time to come given the 
slow pace at which work on food aid is progressing in other fora. The failure of the WTO 
negotiations in Bali to reach a conclusive agreement on food aid and to reform the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture is an example of this.  
 
The Convention is the only legal instrument that makes donors accountable for their 
donations and for the way they fulfil the right to food. The reticence of some States to ratify 
the Convention (especially of those states that have previously been members of the 1999 
FAC) is questionable and should be read as a backwards step in the quest to enhance the 
effectiveness of food assistance.  
 
                                                          
139However this is not to say that the Convention is not binding amongst its Parties. The Convention is a formal 
international agreement -signed and ratified by its Parties- and it has the legal status of a binding international 
agreement. Parties who do not fulfil their commitments violate their international obligations, but the lack of 
appropriate dispute resolution and monitoring mechanisms weakens the force and credibility of the 
commitments endorsed. On the legal status and implications of the lack of monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms of international agreements see Andrew T. Guzman, ͚‹he DesigŶ of IŶteƌŶatioŶal AgƌeeŵeŶts͛, The 
European Journal of International Law (2005), Vol. 16 No. 4, 579–612 
140 See Clapp (n 5) and De Schutter (n 4) 
